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ABSTRACT 
 Organizing and conducting effective psychological operations (PSYOP) in 
support of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives is a complex endeavor fraught 
with many challenges.  The challenges include: a general negative attitude towards 
PSYOP / deception operations, the emphasis on kinetic platforms as the solution set for 
all crises to include unconventional warfare (UW), the sheer lack of numbers in both 
PSYOP personnel and equipment, and a recent upsurge of negativity from the world 
media of U.S. PSYOP due to the utilization of host nation media assets that portrays the 
U.S. as having a heavy hand in censuring the Iraqi and Afghan media.  This thesis will 
examine the benefits of host nation media from World War II to the present that include 
the utilization of media personnel and infrastructure in mediums of radio, newspapers, 
leaflets, posters, magazines, comic books, radio stations, satellite and terrestrial 
television.  The merits of host nation media will be examined by analyzing their effect 
upon Psychological Operations (PSYOP) from the perspective of opposing countries in 
previous wars as well as U.S. PSYOP programs in both past and present conflicts in 
addition to the impact of counter-PSYOP from an adversarial point of view. The final 
goal of the thesis is to illustrate the need for the use of host nation media assets relevant 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A.  OVERVIEW AND PURPOSE.......................................................................1 
B. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................4 
C. THESIS OUTLINE..........................................................................................6 
II. APPLICATION OF PSYOP AND DEFINING HOST NATION MEDIA ............7 
A. APPLICATION OF PSYOP...........................................................................7 
B.        DEFINING THE HOST NATION MEDIA.................................................10 
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES.............................................................................17 
A.        INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................17 
B.        WORLD WAR II ...........................................................................................18 
C. THE KOREAN CONFLICT ........................................................................29 
D. THE VIETNAM CONFLICT.......................................................................38 
E.       OPERATION DESERT STORM..................................................................50 
F.       THE BALKANS ..............................................................................................57 
IV.  OIF / OEF........................................................................................................................65 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................65 
B. PSYOP / PHASE I OIF .................................................................................67 
C. PSYOP / DURING OCCUPATION IN OIF ...............................................77 
D. PSYOP / THE MERLIN INITIATIVE IN SUPPORT OF OEF...............98 
V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................105 
LIST OF REFERENCES....................................................................................................111 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Iraqi host nation media as of November 2003. ................................................12 
Figure 2. 500,000 KW Aspidistra transmitter used against Germany.............................28 
Figure 3. “The UN Troops Treat Them Good” ...............................................................31 
Figure 4. The Army's Armed Forces Radio Service began as a mobile clandestine 
radio stations during the Korean War. .............................................................33 
Figure 5. (Your Place Will Be Empty) Korean War Leaflet 7115..................................36 
Figure 6. Parachute News No. 11 Korea 1952. ...............................................................37 
Figure 7. (American casualty at Khe Sanh and an execution of a Viet Cong)................43 
Figure 8. Leaflet HQ-8-68...............................................................................................45 
Figure 9. PSYOP radio broadcast in Vietnam.................................................................46 
Figure 10. Vietnamese Journalist produce The Wondering Soul recordings....................48 
Figure 11. Similar depiction between Hitler and Hussein.................................................54 
Figure 12. Iraqis Surrendering...........................................................................................56 
Figure 13. Smiling Iraqi EPW; Surrender campaign leaflet. ............................................57 
Figure 14. Leaflet 04-B-02-L005. .....................................................................................59 
Figure 15. NATO PSYOP composition and accompanying host nation media 
personnel. .........................................................................................................61 
Figure 16.  Information Radio Leaflet IZD-001 and IZD-002C. ......................................68 
Figure 17. Enemy Propaganda found by the 10th Mountain Division...............................70 
Figure 18. SOMS-B in BIAP May 2003. ..........................................................................71 
Figure 19. SOMS-B Coverage and Messages from Kuwait. ............................................73 
Figure 20. SOMS-B Coverage and Messages from BIAP. ...............................................74 
Figure 21. SOMS-B Coverage and Messages from Commando Solo. .............................75 
Figure 22. SOMS-B Coverage and Messages From the USS Tarawa. .............................76 
Figure 23. SOMS-B Coverage in Iraq...............................................................................83 
Figure 24. SOMS-B and Host Nation Media Coverage in Iraq. .......................................84 
Figure 25. (Zarqawi Campaign 2005) ...............................................................................86 
Figure 26. (ISF and Iraqis Voting in 2005). ......................................................................86 
Figure 27. (Rewards for Tips Program 2005). ..................................................................87 
Figure 28. (Anti-terrorist billboard along Route Irish near BIAP)....................................88 
Figure 29. (Shanasheel Magazine in Baghdad).................................................................89 
Figure 30. (Shanasheel Magazine in Mosul).....................................................................89 
Figure 31. (The Thunder Team Comic Book)...................................................................90 
Figure 32. (“Tracking the Terrorist”). ...............................................................................91 
Figure 33. (Zarqawi Campaign 2005-6)............................................................................96 
Figure 34. (Merlin Signal Reception)..............................................................................100 
Figure 35. (PSYOP injects for a two week period).........................................................101 
Figure 36. 1 Hour Radio Wheel. .....................................................................................102 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLE 




























I would like to thank my advisors, Dr. Jessica Piombo and LTC (P) Michael  
Ceroli for their insight, helpfulness, and patience in guiding me through my thesis  
development process.  I would also like to thank my immediate peers: Jonathan Keiser,  
Mark Engen, Lee Evans, and Matt Zahn for their helpful input. Lastly, I would like to  
thank my wife, Janelle for her unwavering support and understanding during my thesis  

























A.  OVERVIEW AND PURPOSE 
 Following the terrorist attacks on September 11th, the United States Government 
(USG) and the overwhelming majority of the American people have been perplexed as to 
the reasons for the attacks, as well as wondering what measures are being taken to 
convince the world, specifically, the Middle East, to attenuate the ever growing threat of 
radical Islamic fundamentalism.  An enormous amount of time and resources have been 
spent by the Bush administration, State Department, Department of Defense, and various 
OGAs (Other Government Agencies), on how best to reach target audiences that have a 
profound effect on U.S. national security and objectives.  
The U.S. has been continuously engaged in two enormous military endeavors in 
Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001.  The campaign in Iraq has been deeply plagued by a 
seemingly difficult quagmire against a stubborn insurgency, rising sectarianism, an 
increasingly hostile and disenchanted population that has begun to lose faith in the 
Coalition, as well the enormously difficult task of winning the battle of ideas.  So how 
does the U.S. win the battle of the story?  From a military perspective, the onus for 
swaying target audiences has fallen on psychological operations (PSYOP).   
Since the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, a plethora of PSYOP and 
information campaigns have been conducted in order to influence key target audiences in 
favor of U.S. operations.  Such PSYOP campaigns have used every medium imaginable 
in getting the message out.  For example, PSYOP in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have used loudspeakers, leaflets, posters, handbills, 
satellite television, FM, AM, shortwave radio, bumper stickers, T-shirts, and soccer balls, 
as well as face-to-face communication from all servicemen in contact with local 
populaces.  Additionally, PSYOP campaigns have been tailored to match the receiving 
target audience in terms of size and specificity of the message.  Specific PSYOP products 
have focused on the smallest village or town, while more broad and all-encompassing 
messages have been tailored for specific regions of a country, an entire country, or an 
entire set of countries in a similar culturally geographic region.  Ultimately, the goal of 
influencing target audiences in support of OEF / OIF is to have Iraqis, Afghans, and 
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Middle Easterners in general, espouse the PSYOP objectives of: legitimacy, non-
violence, and eliminating safe havens for violent Jihadist ideology.  
The problem is that the U.S. is currently incapable of producing the conditions for 
winning the battle of the story with its PSYOP force structure and composition of 
personnel and equipment.  Simply stated, the U.S. military and the United States 
Government (USG) does not have the ability to sustain a psychological campaign that 
can reach millions of Iraqis and Afghans at the same time because of the few media 
systems that the U.S. military possesses.  Essentially, years of solely spending on kinetic 
systems, undercutting the Voice of America (VOA), and various instruments of 
persuasion, have now come to a head in terms of engaging in the war of ideas.  As a point 
of comparison, consider the fact that a single company, Phillip Morris, spent more in one 
year on advertising ($2 billion) than the combined budgets of all U.S. agencies engaged 
in information operations and public diplomacy.1 So naturally, the only other alternative 
is to use the somewhat controversial solution to U.S. psychological requirements; the use 
of host nation media.   
As a growing trend, more and more of the broad PSYOP messages have been 
disseminated via host nation media.  Essentially, the host nation media allows U.S. forces 
to utilize existing platforms such as radio stations, TV stations, newspapers, and 
magazines that were originally meant for large audiences.  Rather than solely relying on 
limited U.S. PSYOP dissemination assets, the use of host nation media adds an important 
facet to the PSYOP tool kit.  Media dissemination platforms that were once used to 
transmit state propaganda and keep the public in the dark can be reframed to assist with a 
variety of PSYOP and information campaigns designed to support U.S. operations in a 
given theater.  Accordingly, during Phase I of OEF and OIF, targeting officers viewed 
radio stations, signaling towers, and newspaper plants as potential assets for future 
operations.  Usually such targets were not destroyed unless deemed absolutely necessary 
due to the potential benefit of Psychological Operations. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the impact of Psychological Operations 
(PSYOP) that effectively utilizes host nation media as a means to persuading a given 
                                                 
1 Walter Laqueru. “Save Public Diplomacy: Broadcasting America’s Message Matters.” Public Affairs 
(September / October 1994), 20. 
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target audience towards a behavior that is beneficial to U.S. objectives in a war or 
conflict.  Utilizing host nation media can have many benefits for the U.S.  For one, 
delivering PSYOP messages via host nation media outlets utilizes mediums that are 
familiar to the target audience and are often seen as more legitimate than foreign sources 
of media.  Secondly, the host nation media is a platform that has the ability to reach 
across the broad populace of a given nation, thus effectively disseminating PSYOP 
messages that are meant for larger and broad audiences.  Third, utilizing host nation 
media can be beneficial while augmenting existing U.S. PSYOP programs by assisting 
with: locating high value targets, voting information, command messages, highlighting 
civilian reconstruction programs, et al.   
Utilizing host nation media also helps to create a PSYOP message that the target 
audience can identify with, is far more cost effective than trying to replicate the target 
audiences’ preferred media, and lastly, it sets the given nation, namely Iraq, with a media 
investment for the future.  Unfortunately, for as many good things that can come from 
host nation media, there can also be negative effects.  Controlling the message and its 
dissemination is more difficult when working through proxies, and the very act of turning 
host nation media into proxies for U.S. PSYOP, if uncovered, can undermine the 
indigenous media.  Additionally, historical evidence has shown that the enemy can just as 
effectively use counter PSYOP as well as imitating and perfecting the exact PSYOP used 
against them to turn the tide in their favor.  Therefore, in order to avoid the pitfalls and 
maximize the benefits for future operations, this thesis attempts to draw out the past 
lessons of when the utilization of host nation media enhanced the achievement of mission 
objectives by analyzing the PSYOP strategies used by opposing forces from World War 
II to the present.   
This thesis is also important because it is the first of its kind: to date, no one has 
investigated the tradeoffs of using host nation media to pursue PSYOP goals, and 
therefore the major contribution of this thesis will be to generate a set of testable 
propositions about when host nation media utilization is likely to be effective, and when 
it is not.  Although the thesis is novel in thought, the subject matter is derived from 
experts in the field that have written extensively on the topic of PSYOP to include the 
infusion of host nation media. Such experts in the field include: Stanley Sandler, David 
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Owen, Joseph Goebbels, Sefton Delmer, Henry Latimer, Lawrence Soley, Herbert 
Friedman, Edward Kaufman, and many others in the Psychological Operations Group 
(POGs) that have illuminated the importance of host nation media as a pillar of 
Psychological Operations.   
Ultimately, this thesis will shed some light on the effectiveness of utilizing host 
nation media in light of the recent upsurge in criticism due to the use of such assets.  
Such criticisms paint the U.S. PSYOP programs as buying the Iraqi or Afghan press, and 
thus controlling the press like the previous dictatorships.  Others see the use of host 
nation media as a pitfall because of the target audiences’ perception that the message is 
no longer credible.  My goal is to analyze the historical as well as the contemporary data 
to illustrate the impact upon forces both friendly and foe and to look into the historical 
data to see which forces used it best.  This will provide valuable insight on how best to 
utilize or in the least, deal with the impact of host nation media upon combat operations 
in the future.  
B. METHODOLOGY 
 Overall, the chapters in this thesis will highlight the negative and positive aspects 
of utilizing host nation media gleaned from historical and contemporary data. One 
difficult facet is that PSYOP is not a clean cut science where conclusions can be easily 
drawn; it is more of an art whose effects can be subtle and inconclusive, yet quite 
effective when employed correctly.  Another aspect is that PSYOP takes time for it to 
take its course.  Successful PSYOP campaigns often have identifiable Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOEs) that allow the PSYOP planner and the combatant commander 
indicators that PSYOP is being successful.  However, judging the effectiveness of a 
PSYOP campaign is extremely challenging.  The effect is often cumulative, such as 
getting an enemy force to surrender after repeated PSYOP efforts coordinated with 
several military attacks. It is a frustrating aspect of PSYOP that there is usually no 
immediate and observable link between the cause (PSYOP) and effect.2 Because of the 
difficulty in assessing this particular thesis topic, it was decided that the historical 
                                                 
2 Stephen E. Pease. PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953 (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 
:Stackpole Books, 1992), 12. 
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analysis should be a holistic amalgam of the contributions that host nation media has had 
on PSYOP as well as its impact on the battlefield.   
In terms of evaluating the success of PSYOP, there is no general way to evaluate 
results as the benchmarks for success for each PSYOP mission are unique to themselves. 
Instead of a general rubric for evaluating the campaigns, in this paper “success” will be 
evaluated through the use of measurable actions by the target audience that correlate to 
the objectives and related MOEs that are specific to each PSYOP campaign.3   
As planners develop a PSYOP campaign, they establish specific MOEs that 
provide a systematic means of assessing and reporting the impact a PSYOP program 
(series of PSYOP products and actions) has on specific foreign target audiences. PSYOP 
MOEs, change from mission to mission, and encompass a wide range of factors that are 
fundamental to the overall effect of PSYOP.  PSYOP impact indicators collectively 
provide an indication of the overall effectiveness of the PSYOP campaign. Development 
of MOEs and their associated impact indicators are done during the planning process.  By 
determining the measure in the planning process, PSYOP planners ensure that organic 
assets and PSYOP enablers, such as intelligence, are identified to assist in evaluating 
MOEs for the execution of PSYOP.  Evaluating the effectiveness of PSYOP may take 
weeks or even longer given the inherent difficulties and complexities of the battlefield 
environment.4 
Examples of MOEs are: behavior that is in concert with a specific PYSOP 
product, a sudden increase in surrenders, enemy admissions about the effectiveness of 
PSYOP, enemy counter-PSYOP, combat after action reports (AARs), and interviewing 
prisoners to ascertain whether PSYOP played a role in their capture or surrender.  
Conversely, determining MOEs are often hard to accomplish because results are usually 
vague, often unknown, and are difficult to assess due to its relativity to human nature.  
Additionally, the fog of war makes it difficult to assess due to the numerous variables that 
are working in concert with PSYOP on a daily basis. 
                                                 
3 It is difficult assessing human behavior related to a PSYOP message because there are so many other 
factors in a combat environment that can indirectly sway a target audience to meet a specific PSYOP 
objective. However, there are conclusive MOEs such as EPW polling data, a sudden increase in surrenders, 
or behavior that is so specific as it leaves no doubt that the PSYOP message was being adhered to. 
4 U.S. Joint Publication 3-53. Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations (Fort Monroe, Virginia: 
September 2003), 23. 
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 One example where determining an MOE can prove challenging is a PSYOP 
program that is employed to lower the morale of a foreign target audience.  The lowering 
of morale in itself is a difficult outcome to measure, especially if access to the target 
audience is difficult as well. However, the lowering of morale can lead to situations that 
can easily be discerned such as riots, civil discontent among the youth, an overthrow or a 
favorable election of a foreign government.  In the end, the challenges of linking PSYOP 
with outcomes are an everyday facet that continuously has to be dealt with.  Such 
disparities and vagueness of MOEs are addressed in this thesis by utilizing experts with 
the benefit of hindsight in the field to fill the gaps and provide a clear assessment of the 
true impact of host nation media.  Unfortunately, many of the documents and records that 
are crucial in determining the effectives of PSYOP have long been destroyed, lost, or 
continue to be secretly held.5   
C. THESIS OUTLINE 
  In Chapter I, the thesis problem is introduced.  In Chapter II, aspects of U.S. 
PSYOP and the host nation media are briefly discussed as a primer in order to allow the 
reader to gain insight on the nuances of each media and how their inter-relations effect 
each other. Chapter III will examine historical case studies whereupon host nation media 
have been used.  It will also provide the foundation and the direction of the thesis based 
on the positive and negative aspects of utilizing host nation media in a variety of combat 
operations.  Chapter IV will be a continuance of chapter three but with a detailed 
emphasis on two contemporary conflicts; OIF and the Merlin shortwave initiative during 
OEF.  And lastly, Chapter V will draw upon conclusions based on the case files 
examined that will either support or negate the use of host nation media assets in support 
of PSYOP.   
 
                                                 
5 Michael Balfour. Propaganda, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany (London: Routledge and 
Kegan 1979), 99. 
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II. APPLICATION OF PSYOP AND DEFINING HOST NATION 
MEDIA 
A. APPLICATION OF PSYOP 
The moral of the enemy is the target of high priority, its reduction an 
essential preliminary to the armed clash. 
                                                                   --Sun Tzu, The Art of War6      
The overall purpose of this thesis paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of utilizing 
host nation media assets in support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP). Before we can 
define host nation media, it is necessary to provide a clear understanding of what PSYOP 
is and is not.  Generally, in terms of the U.S., PSYOP is viewed as an effective force 
multiplier at every level to include: U.S. politicians, the media, the U.S. populace, and 
military commanders.  However, what is not agreed upon are the usage of tactics that are 
deceptive in nature in spite of their effectiveness.  Although PSYOP is a viable combat 
multiplier, it has different meanings and connotations to many that include being seen by 
decision makers, a large number of Americans, and even military commanders in a 
negative light.  Others see PSYOP as sort of a mystic spoon-bending apparatus and 
perceived as un-American in nature.    
The 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) defines PSYOP as planned 
operations that convey selected information and indicators to foreign target audiences 
(TAs) to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the 
behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.  The emphasis 
is placed on foreign audiences because in accordance with U.S. law, it is not permissible 
to target U.S. citizens with PSYOP messages.7  Essentially, PSYOP messages of all 
forms are the maneuver commander’s tool to communicate with foreign target audiences.  
While PSYOP is considered a combat and diplomatic multiplier, more importantly, it is 
also considered a combat reducer.  The basic fundamental role of PSYOP is to get the 
desired target audience to adhere to the commander’s objectives without the use of 
kinetic means, since that entails loss of life and equipment on both sides, as well as 
                                                 
6 Samuel B. Griffith  trans. Sun Tzu: The Art of War (New York: Oxford Press, 1971), 54. 
7 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne).  PSYOP Officers Course 1-04 Lecture Notes (Fort 
Bragg, NC 2005), 2. 
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employing forces that are possibly needed elsewhere.  To effect the mission, the target 
audience must feel that adhering to the U.S. PSYOP message benefits them in some sort 
of fashion.  For many it could mean self preservation, prosperity, financial gain, reducing 
terrorism, and increasing the ambient security.   
Through these methods, PSYOP campaigns attempt to use carrots instead of 
sticks, persuasion instead of force.  In this way, PSYOP campaigns are meant to alleviate 
the pressures put on kinetic units. The logic is that since the fighting forces cannot be 
everywhere they are needed, “soft power” techniques augment their presence.8 As 
defined by Joseph S. Nye Jr., soft power “is the ability to get what you want through 
attraction rather than coercion or payments.”9  Because PSYOP campaigns aim to 
influence behavior as well winning the hearts and minds of a target audience, they can be 
considered as instruments of soft power that operate at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical level.   
  Strategic level PSYOP include international information, campaigns conducted by 
U.S. Government Agencies to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in 
favor of U.S. goals and objectives during peacetime and conflict. These endeavors 
predominantly take place outside the military arena but can use DoD assets and receive 
support from military PSYOP forces.  Operational level PSYOP is conducted across the 
range of military operations in a defined operational area to promote the effectiveness of 
the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC’s) campaigns and strategies, and to strengthen U.S. 
and multinational capabilities to conduct military operations.  A clear example of 
operational PSYOP is a product or message that is intended for the entire audience of 
Iraq.  The operational aspect of the message is broad enough for the entire target audience 
of Iraq to consume without getting too specific, or alienating one group from another.  
Such uses of operational PSYOP are most effective when used with broad ranging 
mediums such as FM, AM, shortwave radio, satellite, terrestrial television, and 
newspapers due to the broad and general nature of the message.  Tactical PSYOP are 
operations conducted in the area assigned by a tactical commander across the range of 
                                                 
8 Joseph S. Nye PhD. Soft Power, The Means to Success in the Political World. (New York: Public 
Affairs a member of the Perseus Books Group 2004), 5. 
9 Ibid. 
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military operations to support the tactical mission against opposing forces, and shape and 
influence military and civilian perceptions within the tactical commander’s area of 
operations.  Tactical PSYOP provides a means to minimize resistance and interference 
while facilitating military objectives.10  An example of tactical PSYOP could be a 
message from a division commander in Fallujah, Iraq that implores the local citizens to 
inform coalition forces of any possible insurgents within their neighborhoods.  This thesis 
will primarily analyze operations conducted at the Operational PSYOP level, and 
depending on the message, the tactical PSYOP as well.   
In addition to the levels of PSYOP (strategic, operational, and tactical), there are 
also different forms of PSYOP based on the target audiences’ perception of where the 
source of the message is coming from.  The perceived source of the PSYOP is a critical 
factor for the use of host nation media assets in terms of maintaining credibility with the 
target audience as well as disguising the origin of the message. Generally, PSYOP 
messages at all levels can be classified as white, gray, or black PSYOP.  White PSYOP, 
which comprises the overwhelming majority of all PSYOP products, is PSYOP in which 
the target audience can clearly discern the actual source of the message.  An example is a 
radio message or a television commercial that is directly from the Multi-National Force-
Iraq (MNF-I) commander describing the need for the local populace to call the terrorist 
hotline if a suspicious activity is observed.  Overall, the message leaves very little doubt 
in the target audience’s mind where the source is coming from.   
 The second type of PSYOP is gray PSYOP.  Gray PSYOP is one which the 
source of the message is unclear to the target audience.  An example might be a television 
commercial that is depicted as being directly from the Iraqi government but its actual 
content and source is actually from MNF-I.  This form of PSYOP is quite critical since it 
allows the fledgling Iraqi government to take credit for the actual source of the message.  
When discussing the use of host nation media to disseminate messages, we mostly refer 
to this form of PSYOP. The third type is black PSYOP.  Black PSYOP occurs when a 
carefully crafted message intentionally misrepresents the source.  An example of black 
                                                 
10 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne).  PSYOP Officers Course 1-04 Lecture Notes (Fort 
Bragg, NC  2005), 3. 
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PSYOP could be a doctored letter that is perceived to be from one terrorist to another that 
falsely states an intention to surrender.  It is important to note that just because a product 
is considered white does not mean that it is truthful. The same can be said with gray and 
black PSYOP. However, the overwhelming majority of PSYOP is truthful because 
messages and PSYOP campaigns are based on maintaining credibility with the target 
audience. Essentially, a PSYOP product ceases to become viable once the target audience 
recognizes it to be false.  This is an important and also delicate aspect of utilizing host 
nation media.  If false stories are prevalent, and the target audience recognizes that the 
host nation media is a propaganda outlet for the U.S., the entire premise of utilizing host 
nation media is then jeopardized.   
B.        DEFINING THE HOST NATION MEDIA 
 Host nation media is the medium or source of information that is readily watched, 
read, or listened to by the target audience that the U.S. is trying to influence.  In many 
areas of conflict the host nation usually hold a decisive advantage against any U.S. 
PSYOP systems in regards to sophistication, range, quality, quantity, and accessibility to 
the desired target audience. If the majority of a given nation attains their news and 
entertainment via satellite television, then it would make sense to take advantage of the 
media vectors that the target audience gravitates to.  It is important to understand that 
what is seen or heard in one country, may not be the case in another.  Simple cookie 
cutter PSYOP programs seldom work, as they must have the correct cultural nuances, 
language, and dissemination mediums that are specific to a desired target audience.  An 
example is the comparison of media in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In Iraq, the predominant 
means of attaining information is satellite television, radio, and newspapers in that 
order.11  In Afghanistan, the primary medium is shortwave radio with very little 
television and print.  Effectively, Iraq and Afghanistan are two countries with different 
cultural norms, languages, literacy rates, and mediums for acquiring information.  
Therefore, utilizing host nation media assets in each country require PSYOP campaigns 
that are appropriate for each type of media.   
                                                 
11 MNF-I, Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) media poll conducted (Baghdad, Iraq: March 
2005). 
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 Just as intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is important in determining 
the disposition of the enemy, equally important is the intelligence that accurately depicts 
cultural fault lines as well as identifying the most popular forms of media.  In targeting 
the media outlets, a detailed map of the region with all the newspapers, radio stations, 
television stations, power stations is crucial in understanding the information 
environment.  
 Attaining critical data such as transmission power, coverage, gain, wattage, and 
propagation are critical in understanding what assets will be available once operations 
commence within a given theater.  Out of this information, the U.S. military prepares an 
information propagation picture that details the countries’ top television and radio 
stations, newspapers, print presses, and any form of media that could be critical in 
gaining advantage in PSYOP.  In Iraq, the information propagation picture depicted 
below was prepared by November of 2003.  During this period, many of the newspapers 
and radio stations were assessed to be cooperative or receptive for potential U.S. PSYOP 
broadcasts and print while others were perceived as hostile.  This was important because 
it defined the host nation information battle space in relation to U.S. operations during the 
early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom.12 
 
                                                 




Figure 1. Iraqi host nation media as of November 2003.13   
In addition to the host nation media, U.S. PSYOP has to also contend with an 
international media such as Al Jazeera that are even more sophisticated than anything the 
U.S. is currently capable of producing.14  Additionally, with the advent of satellite TV, 
the U.S. not only has to compete with anti-coalition media within a country, it now has to 
contend with neighboring satellite reception and programming that is anti-U.S. as well.  
Essentially, cable and satellite TV and radio, and especially the public internet, offer far 
more choices than over-the-air networks did formerly.15  Yet technological advances, 
                                                 
13 MNFI-I Strategic Communications (STATCOM) Media Assessment (Camp Victory, Iraq; 
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2000), 13. 
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while they pose challenges to PSYOP programs, also present new opportunities. For one, 
the new technologies introduce a broad range of channels that a target audience in a host 
nation can now watch. This multiplies the possible entry points for PSYOP messages. 
This has the potential of broadening the target audience’s horizon by exposing them to 
objective programming. Another positive is the target audience in the Middle East, 
especially in Iraq, poses a strong demand for satellite television, of which many are 
receptive to sell air time to the U.S. government. On balance, however, the U.S. PSYOP 
effort is placed in a definite disadvantage due to the collective and virtually unlimited 
investment that the world-wide media possesses compared to the very limited amount of 
money invested by the U.S. in PSYOP as a whole.      
In addition to considering all the possible forms of media for PSYOP exploitation, 
it also must be flexible and adaptive.  A good PSYOP program must recognize that it 
cannot remain postured as it was during the beginning of hostilities. It must adapt and 
change with the current environment. For instance, when despotic regimes are 
overthrown, there is a tendency for a surge in communications of all sorts.  This is due to 
a breakdown of the strict monopoly that was once previously held by the state - now 
being turned into an information vacuum.16  During my time in Kosovo in 2001-02, I was 
amazed how quickly satellite dishes were popping up once the oppressive regime fell.  
From a good vantage point, one could see at least a thousand dishes from any direction.   
In order to be successful, changing and adapting the PSYOP plan may have to 
mirror the current trends in the media.  Unfortunately, that is not an investment that the 
U.S. normally makes as opposed to “E Qaeda” who remain high-tech and always  
managing to stay parallel with the current media fore structure.17 
 There is no doubt that the PSYOP effort for the U.S. is an uphill and arduous 
battle.  The battle of the story is up for grabs, and it seems that Al Qaeda has mastered it 
superbly.  For Al Qaeda, they do not have a massive expenditure on advertising budget 
                                                 
16 Phillips W. Davison, “The Third Person Effect in Communication.” Public Opinion Quarterly 
(1983), 47. 
17 Remarks of John Arquilla during a presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School on the “Warfare 
in the Information Age” ( Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California September 2005), 12.  John 
Arquilla is a professor of defense analysis at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California.   
Dr Arquilla is a former policy analyst at the RAND Corporation who has written extensively on terrorist 
networks and foreign policy.  His works include: From Troy to Entebbe, In Athena’s Camp, Networks and 
Net wars, and the Reagan Imprint. 
14 
that doles out money to the world media; they simply let their actions receive air time for 
free.18  The relationship with Al Qaeda and the media is an interesting paradox.  The 
news outlets are always hungry for a story, and Al Qaeda’s spectacular attacks give them 
that source.  Al Qaeda then has a willing source to project their terror via the newspapers, 
radio stations, satellite and terrestrial television. It is almost a pseudo-symbiotic 
relationship.  How many thousands of hours of news time did the attacks on 9/11 
produce?  The amount is staggering.  Overall, Al Qaeda is executing an effective job of 
manipulating the media to spread its terror.  The U.S. should not expect anything less 
than Al Qaeda continuing ongoing operations with the same methodology for the next 
several decades.19    
In addition to Al Qaeda, the U.S. also has to contend with the endemic hatred for 
U.S. foreign policy around the world.  U.S.-backed repressive rulers such as the House of 
Saud in Saudi Arabia, Suharto in Indonesia, and General Sani Abacha in Nigeria, while 
discreetly making deals with their American patrons and often enriching themselves from 
oil revenues, have proven their piety to the masses by encouraging the state-controlled 
press to demonize America.20  The media have thus provided the government a safety 
valve through which to redirect anger from their social and political failures.  Nowhere is 
this threat greater than in Saudi Arabia.  Bin Laden is, in many ways, that country’s true 
son, a product of the contradiction between the sheikdom’s support for U.S. strategic 
interests and the virulent anti-Americanism that the Saudis cultivate and export from their 
mosques and madrasas.21 
 Clearly the U.S. response to an ever challenging war of ideas should come from 
all aspects and at all levels from the U.S. government.  One answer to stem the tide of 
hatred towards the U.S. is the formulation of an international voice comprised of the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).  Formulated in 1999 as a result of the alarming 
success that hate radio had in the Balkans, its goal was to influence foreign audiences’ 
and conduct objective broadcasting.  The BBG is reported to have over a 100 million 
                                                 
18 Remarks of John Arquilla during a presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School on the “Warfare 
in the Information Age” ( Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California September 2005), 12.     
19 Ibid. 
20 David Hoffman. “Beyond Public Diplomacy” Foreign Affairs (March / April 2002), 86.  
21 Ibid.  
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listeners that tune into the BBG for U.S. sponsored TV programs that range in over 65 
languages.  The overall objective is promoting democracy through timely and objective 
broadcasting.22   
However, despite the BBG playing a critical role in delivering information to 
critical areas around the world, to this date, the U.S. has not established programming 
that adequately addresses the growing surge in satellite television and the internet.23 The 
lack of satellite usage as a medium can be solved with the buying of more air time. The 
problem with purchasing more air time, though, is budgetary: since the BBG was created 
in 1994, its budget has declined by about 12 percent, from $573 million to $507 
million.24  The BBG has the programming, but needs more satellite time and modern 
television production facilities and equipment, not only in the United States but also in 
regional centers overseas, to combat biased stations such as Al Jazeera.25 Conversely, Al 
Qaeda can be seen and heard on the internet, satellite television, as well as radio for free 
of charge because their message is newsworthy.  Likewise, Usama Bin Laden and other 
Al Qaeda leaders are aired internationally via high tech satellite television, while the U.S. 
message is concentrated on a secondary form of media throughout most of the world.  It 
seems ironic that Al Qaeda can deliver a video tape to Al Jazeera within hours; the tape is 
then played or aired to millions around the world.  Therein lies the challenge in Strategic 
Information and PSYOP planning at all levels in terms of winning the war of ideas. 
Fortunately for the U.S., the platform that Usama Bin Laden enjoys has also been 
available to the U.S. Sadly, the opportunity has been squandered.  In his September 20 
speech to the nation, President Bush defined the U.S. attitude to the rest of the world – 
but particularly to toward Arabs and Muslims in unequivocal terms.  “Either you are with 
us or with the terrorists,” President Bush warned the rest of the world in his speech to a 
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joint session of congress.  Such a polarized message does not address the threat of 
terrorism and leaves little room for dialogue.26  The lesson that can be inferred strikes not 
only at the importance of having the ability to convey the message, but more importantly, 
actually saying the right message to the right target audience.  A secondary lesson is the 
diffusion of the message from the intended target audience to the unintended target 
audience.   Although the speech was effective in terms of the American populace, the 
message soon reached foreign governments that were not necessarily receptive to being 
placed on the spot, especially countries such as Pakistan whose government possesses a 
tenuous and fragile control over much of its territory. 
                                                 
26 Lamis Andoni. “Deeds Speak Louder Than Words.” The Washington Quarterly (2003). The Center 
for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology : 262. Lamis Andoni, 
a Middle East analyst, is widely published in Western and Arabic newspapers. 
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III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 
A.        INTRODUCTION 
 In supporting the thesis, it was important to examine the utility of host nation 
media not only in the present, but in the past as well.  Instead of just picking specific 
instances in history, it was important to examine several engagements, going back six 
decades to establish a historical baseline that would prove its importance regardless of the 
time period. However, with so many historical case studies to choose from, it is 
imperative that the case studies represent pertinent examples for the examination of the 
benefits and drawbacks of utilizing or replicating host nation media assets.   
In this chapter, the case studies that were picked include significant uses of host 
nation media from World War II to the present era that had a dramatic impact. In that 
sense, the use of host nation media can truly be examined in a holistic manner whose 
merits can be judged as standing the test of time.  The analysis begins with World War II 
because that is where the use of radio and the maximization of host nation media first 
came into effect.  The Germans and the English felt so highly about the importance of 
host nation media that they chose to replicate national media outlets in their black 
PSYOP programs. The next case is the Korean Conflict, which is important because it 
showed how a previously non-existent and severely undermanned PSYOP fore structure 
benefited from host nation media.  An analysis of Vietnam, provide accounts of specific 
campaigns of PSYOP that were effective and successful in their goals of winning the war 
of ideas for the North Vietnamese. The aspects of Desert Storm and the Balkans are 
important because these cases transition into the use of host nation media in the era of the 
24 hour news cycle.   
In terms of the metrics in examining each case, the historical case studies will not 
have a uniform set of evaluation criteria because of the variances in MOEs. Instead, the 
analysis will hone in on whether the MOEs specific to the PSYOP campaign in a 
particular conflict were successfully achieved with the aid of host nation media.  The 
MOEs that support the thesis will be driven from enemy behavior, imitation, opposing 
accounts on the effects, and the long-term historical analysis from veterans and experts 
alike. Historical analysis is important because MOEs are often uncovered years  
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or even decades after a conflict is over. An example is a veteran of a war being 
interviewed or archives discovered that addresses the impact of a particular PSYOP 
program.   
The advent of radio, television, and newspapers, as a source for psychological 
operations has been prevalent throughout most of the 20th century.  Since people in either 
peacetime or war depend upon the media for information, naturally, opposing forces have 
tried to utilize the host nation media to gain a psychological advantage over the enemy 
and the populace. Additionally, since the host nation media is often the most trusted 
media in a given country, opposing states have also gone to great lengths in re-creating 
host nation media with the hopes of injecting occasional psychological products that 
supported their wartime objectives. The cases examined include the use of media in 
World War II by the English and the Germans.  Additionally, historical examples in 
Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, and the Balkans will establish a step-by-step 
chronological analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of host nation media.  The analysis 
will then set the stage for Chapter IV in which contemporary use of host nation media 
will be examined.   
B.        WORLD WAR II 
 Out of the many examples throughout the 20th century, the PSYOP and 
propaganda efforts in World War II are distinct due to the uninhibited environment and 
the nature of the PSYOP and propaganda campaigns of both the Allies and the Axis 
powers.  As a result, the PSYOP efforts had a profound effect on the outcome of the war.  
In the book The Radio War, David Owen describes how radio waves carried signals and 
communications between ships and aircraft, bases and units, headquarters and agents, on 
a scale never experienced.  The very medium of radio waves and print became an entirely 
new battlefield with its own weaponry, its own tactics and its own rules.27  In terms of 
assessing the impact that host nation media had, the primary MOEs for determining 
success in World War II for this thesis will be: captured prisoners, enemy counter  
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PSYOP, recorded behavior in direct concert with the PSYOP message, enemy 
admissions, captured documents, imitation of the enemies’ PSYOP strategies, and 
historical hindsight.28 
Prior to and during the beginning of the war, the predominance of the campaigns 
consisted of mainly white PSYOP.  As mentioned in Chapter II, white PSYOP utilizes 
messages whose sources are easily identifiable by the intended audience.  Such messages 
were expanded during this period when there was an explosion of mass communication- 
broadcasting, worldwide wire news services, mobile printing presses, and motion pictures 
that provided instruments of psychological operations previously undreamed of.29  White 
PSYOP was masterfully used by the Minister of Information, Joseph Goebbels, who 
orchestrated the use of radio, the press, demonstrations, group meetings abroad, agents, 
displays, and once the attacks started, screaming dive bombers.  The Nazis gave the first 
full dress-demonstration of what psychological operations can accomplish with the new 
tools of mass communication.30  Its effect was so profound that the Allies began 
following suit. 
 PSYOP campaigns of both the Allies and Axis powers expanded to not only 
conducting white PSYOP, but also conducted black PSYOP deception operations that set 
propaganda campaigns to a whole new level.  This was quite a change since white 
PSYOP was the norm that typically was used for surrender appeals and the lowering of 
the enemies’ morale.31 The recognition of both sides of the effects of host nation media 
led to multiple efforts to control, negate, and replicate such information mediums.  Such 
replication of PSYOP took hold and evolved into effective black PSYOP campaigns that 
had a dramatic effect upon the war.    
 White PSYOP broadcast from England to Germany, and vice versa, would 
concentrate on overt radio messages that concentrated on German or British defeats while 
also encouraging morale within their country and lowering morale upon the citizens and 
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military personnel of their adversary.  The broadcasters were well known, which meant 
that the goals of the broadcasts were obvious to the target audiences, and the recipients, 
knowing the source of the messages, would already know what the content of the 
message would be. This limited the utility of white PSYOP, because it only spoke to 
those already “converted” to the message.32   
On the other hand, if a so-called British radio station were to produce normal pro-
British broadcasts, the effect of any occasional hint of bad news would be greatly 
magnified, as its listeners would tend to accept it as the truth; thus the essence of black 
PSYOP.33 Therefore, as opposed to white PSYOP, black PSYOP was carefully disguised. 
Black PSYOP had to be quite clever to be believed by the target audience.  Radio stations 
that produced black PSYOP produced broadcasts that were in accordance with the target 
audiences’ expectation. As the listeners tuned in to familiar music, various entertainment 
shows, and news updates, the listeners would then be ripe for occasional bits of 
information that would be misleading.  The uncertainty of the listeners would often cause 
panic, a lowering of morale, and wasted resources and time in reaction to the false 
PSYOP.   
During World War II, black PSYOP was relatively easy to create because the 
British and the Germans were no stranger to each other’s culture. Such familiarity 
allowed for the re-creation of host nation media that were incredibly identical to actual 
host nation media in terms of content, colloquialisms, language, and even the expected 
regional accents within Germany or Great Britain.  The results of such familiarity 
allowed for fake message broadcasts to be believed by the target audience because they 
could not discern the difference between legitimate media and external PSYOP.  In fact, 
the PSYOP broadcasts were so close to the actual host nation media that it created an 
aura of confusion when the targeted country would refute the broadcast. An example is a 
PSYOP radio broadcast from Germany to France that is then refuted by the French and 
then followed by another PSYOP broadcast refuting Frances’s counter PSYOP message.  
This PSYOP game of “who’s on first-who’s on second” left the target audience not 
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knowing who or what to believe.  Joseph Goebbels thrived on such confusion by insisting 
that the PSYOP messages be “genuine to British listeners by making scathing attacks on 
Germany and the Nazis, but underneath this sugar-coating came the propaganda pill.”34  
Such deceptive tactics were mastered by the Germans and was a factor in their success 
early in the war.35  
The Germans began their psychological offensive in the winter of 1939-1940 
under the strict supervision of Joseph Goebbels.  By January and February, two secret 
transmitters began broadcasting against the British and the French.  One transmitter was 
passed off as a secret station run by the French Communist Party, while the other posed 
as an anti-government British station that was based in Ireland. On 10 May, 1940, 
German forces swept into Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg and France while also 
shattering or overtaking all communication nodes in the process.  All throughout Western 
Europe, people were worried and impatient with official broadcasts that shed little light 
on the situation. Rumors were rampant and a target audience evolved as well as an 
information void that the Germans could exploit. Thus the conditions were set for the 
Germans to begin to take advantage of a vulnerable target audience in need of any news 
and information.36 
  Seizing the communications advantage, the Germans began transmitting news 
items via German and captured host nation transmitters about the “Fifth Columnists” that 
were perceived by many to be rampant throughout Western Europe. The concept of the 
“Fifth Columnists” was a fabrication by German propagandists that according to radio, 
“to be found anywhere and everywhere, organizing acts of sabotage, treachery and 
murder to help the French defeat.”37  Hitting multiple targets in one message, the 
Germans also transmitted that many of the saboteurs were Germans in the guise of Jewish 
refugees, which helped the Germans to manipulate the French into persecuting Jewish 
refugees who were seeking escape from persecution in Germany.  This was evidenced in  
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Joseph Goebbel’s secret conference notes.  In these notes, Goebbel commented on the 
“Fifth Columnists” programs, saying “in the present situation, even Jews from Germany 
are nothing but German agents.”38 
 As the Germans pushed their advance deeper in French territory, and the French 
military was in utter chaos and retreat, the confusion and panic amongst the populace 
grew even worse.  It was then that the German transmitters began stepping up their 
transmissions with their “watch out for the Fifth Columnist” scare with unprecedented 
success.39  As predicted and planned by the Germans, the “Fifth Column” scare began to 
creep into the French newspapers and continued to cause even further damage to an 
already desperate and depressing situation. This was helped by the fact that German 
influence had crept into the French news papers to the tune of 350 million francs reported 
during a six month period leading up to the Munich agreement and much more 
thereafter.40  
The PSYOP broadcast caused the French populace to worry about the “Fifth 
Column” and concentrated on looking for traitors in their midst as opposed to countering 
the true threat, the German advance.  Amazingly, the panic was started and perpetuated 
by mostly French officials who “were obsessed by what they imagined the Fifth Column 
to have done.”41 Additionally, the Germans planted stories in the broadcasts that warned 
the Germans were pillaging all the cash from banks, thus causing the French to 
precipitate an economic breakdown as a result of a panic to withdraw their money from 
the French banks.42   
Overall, is there is “evidence that there was a large listening audience that tuned 
into the German broadcast such as the Stuttgart broadcasts even despite the realization 
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that some channels were German in disguise.”43  Unfortunately for the French, the 
listening audience was also the French military that would eventually find itself 
struggling with collaboration and resistance towards the invading Germans.44 Ironically, 
even if the Black PSYOP broadcast was discovered to be German, “the French public and 
the military listened because they distrusted their government and the French media; a 
distrust that was hardened by the French government’s vacillating policies, past 
deceptions, and failure to clearly explain why it was at war with Germany over 
Poland.”45  The final testament to the effectiveness of the broadcasts was the mistrust of 
the French government as a result of the propaganda effort of the black German PSYOP 
broadcasts throughout the early part of the war, of which the primary target was Prime 
Minister Paul Reynaud.  As France collapsed, Reynaud was arrested and nearly executed 
while Marsal Phillippe Petain established the pro-Nazi Vichy government, per the wishes 
of the various clandestine (seemingly French) radio broadcasts.46 
The decisive defeat of France was a culmination of kinetic and soft power assets 
that took advantage of a populace panicked by tanks and dive bombers, as well as the 
threat of the fabricated “Fifth Column” that was perceived to be around them. Such panic 
was then amplified by the French media by prominent writers such Charles Rolo. Like 
many writers in the 1940s, Rolo believed that a “Nazi fifth column undermined France’s 
ability to fight and led to the rapid defeat of the French army during the brief May-June 
1940 war.”47 Similarly, Edmond Taylor48 a journalist in France during the German 
invasion and later turned OSS agent, described in his book, The Strategy of Terror, “how 
                                                 
43 Lawrence C Soley. Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda (New York: Praeger 
Publishers 1989), 14. 
44 Janos Radvanyi, Pierre Lacoste. Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long-Term 
Strategic Planning: The French Army and Psychological Warfare (Westport, CT: Greenwood Pub Group. 
1990), 36. 
45 Central and Western Europe: Prospects of Russian Dominance” (January 11, 1944), FDR, Map 
Room Files, box 73, OSS Numbered Bulletin 94. 
46 Lawrence C. Soley.  Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda (New York: Praeger 
Publishers 1989), 18. 
47 Gaston Coblentz. “German Revolt Asked by Exile Group in Russia. “ New York Herald Tribune, 22 
June 1943, 6. 
48 Edmond Taylor became a widely cited author among psychological warfare theorists due to his 
extensive experience as a journalist in France and as an OSS agent. 
 
24 
rumors, sabotage, and above ground and clandestine broadcasts worked together to bring 
about the defeat of France.”49 In fact, the German PSYOP was so good that he 
recommended the need to utilize Fifth Column tactics- “fighting fire with fire” to the 
eventual creator of the OSS (the present day CIA).50 Soon Bill Donovan, who recruited 
Taylor, began to believe in the effectiveness of this strategy that would ultimately have a 
measurable impact on how the OSS viewed PSYWAR.51 
The overall use of PSYOP media started with a few German transmitters and then 
grew with captured French transmitters, and then snowballed into the full-force German 
PSYOP that made its way into the actual host nation French media.  The result was a 
German attack designed to “demoralize the enemy, to destroy the cohesion, discipline, 
and collective morale [of France]….to break the enemy’s will to win or simply his will to 
resist.”52 The result was a “systematic and complete collapse of a European superpower, 
and the world being stunned at a German military machine that had just decimated the 
French.”53  Additionally, the method and rapidity of the French collapse profoundly 
affected the British who soon began to believe there were Fifth Columns in England as 
well.54 
 Most historians agree that the Germans were beat in World War II by the Allied 
Forces imitating their tactics and producing similar weaponry. The German use of Panzer 
tanks, air-land doctrine, and the first use of paratroopers were all mimicked to perfection 
by the allies.55  The Allies also incorporated the Germans’ PSYOP techniques and used 
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similar campaigns to affect the demise of the Third Reich. The British soon became quite 
adept in the information domain and soon began conducting black PSYOP that replicated 
German host nation media and exploited target audiences in similar fashion.  
Such exploitations were made infamous by a journalist named Sefton Delmer, the 
mastermind of the British black PSYOP campaign during WWII.  Sefton Delmer was an 
Australian professor who spent time as a newsman in Berlin became very familiar with 
the German culture and mindset, as well as being fluent in German. Eventually, through 
various connections in the media, Delmer became acquainted with Adolf Hitler, Joseph 
Goebbels, Heinrich Himmler, Hermann Goering, and various Nazis within the Third 
Reich.  By 1940, he moved to England due to his opposition to the Nazi regime and 
quickly gained acceptance into the intelligence world after a lengthy security clearance 
process.56 
 After obtaining his clearance, Delmer began work immediately by manning two 
radio programs.  One was led by a group called The Émigré German Marxists that ran the 
program: Radio of the European Revolution.  The other was run under the guise that 
targeted the right-wing opposition to the Nazis. Like the Germans, Delmer, made his 
listeners believe that a large and active resistance organization was thriving within 
Germany.  In a clever move, Delmer made the programs patriotic whose target audiences 
were lower ranking Nazis.  His broadcasts criticized the senior Nazi officials “who were 
bungling the direction of the war, letting down the soldiers and the people, and feathering 
their own nests at the expense of Germany.”57  Other radio programs he made gave the 
German soldiers manning the Atlantic Wall a feeling of isolation and hopelessness, while 
many of their colleagues were being sent to the Eastern front to face the Soviets.58   
Delmer’s programs cut at the heart of natural curiosity.  Much of the success was 
because “they secured a hearing as does gossip, or a newspaper columnist, by gratifying 
curiosity and anxiety, the desire to know as much as possible, to get the [‘inside story’], 
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even at the cost of not knowing how much of it is reliable.”59  To appease such a 
curiosity, Delmer concocted stories how blood was being obtained from Russian and 
Polish POWs, and then were given to German soldiers and citizens despite the fact that 
much of the blood supply was infected with venereal diseases and various impurities. The 
result was another series of morale killers that made many within Germany become leery 
of receiving blood transfusions or giving blood in general.60  
 As the programs began to make their mark, Delmer switched themes in order to 
keep up with changing attitudes.  For instance, Delmer began focusing on pro-desertion 
programming that gave subtle hints that Americans and British officials had been very 
generous with German POWs by supplying them with a healthy food quota, as well as 
emphasizing the ever increasing numbers of deserters as well.61  As the war progressed, 
the programming became so effective that even the Allies were fooled into believing they 
were credible. One example is the Delmer lead radio station, Gustav Siegfried.  American 
attaches in London not privy to the Black PSYOP programs, mistook the programming to 
be German in nature, and reported back to Washington that there was a “dramatic 
increase in hostilities between Nazi party and army leaders.”62 
As the war progressed, opportunities began to appear for British PSYOP 
broadcasts. The assassination attempt of Adolf Hitler provided an incredible angle for 
which to manipulate. During the aftermath of the assassination attempt, the programs 
emphasized and suggested that the plot was far larger than anyone in Germany had 
realized, and that the time was now to seize power and bring piece to Germany at last.  
The result was a deepening of the German ranks and a growing distrust for the 
Wehrmacht by the Nazi regime.63  Such distrust is further evidenced by the secret 
Gestapo files that showed estimates of listenership rising from 1 million in 1941 to 15 
million in 1944 with the penalty for being caught rising proportionally from being a 
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misdemeanor, to a felony, and then ultimately to death.  Amazingly, even at the cost of 
death, the PSYOP stations increased their target audience by 1,500 percent.64  
Other evidence to the effectiveness of the broadcast can be measured by the 
“extent to which the German broadcasters devoted themselves to answering both overt 
radio stations such as the BBC as well as clandestine radio stations, usually but by no 
means always saying where they came from.”65 One such radio station that was 
constantly challenged by the Germans was called Der Chief.  The purpose of the black 
PSYOP station was to turn the ordinary fighting German against their Nazi leaders with 
programs meant create a rift within the ranks such as this excerpt: 
If it should be a question of choosing between Goering or Himmler, then, 
by God and all the saints, let us have 30,000 hundred-weight of Hermann, 
rather than one milligram of this scheming political out-house flower, of 
the anemic inflated windbag, Heinrich Himmler…66 
 
As the tide started to turn against Germany, the British began culminating their 
PSYOP campaign that would further destabilize an already chaotic and war-torn 
Germany.  At the request of Winston Churchill, PSYOP radio programming began 
targeting the civilian populace who were now stricken with strife and panic. In a radio 
program called Soldatensender Calais, the British began targeting civilians who were 
fleeing as fast as the German military via a massive wattage transmitter.  The aim was to 
confuse the people by announcing false staging points and evacuation orders and thus 
clog the road arteries that were badly needed by the retreating German forces.  Such 
confusion caused the German people to second guess the Nazi regime, and was further 
enforced by Soldatensender Calais’ “rumors and gossip that portrayed German political 
and military leaders in a bad light.”67  During the closing months of the war, when the 
German populace was starved for information, the German radio stations would only play 
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classical music, failing to satisfy the demand for information.68  The German populace 
then started to turn to whatever outlet for information that was available, and this source 
turned out to be Soldatensender Calais. After the war, a survey was conducted that 
“found that 23 percent of respondents who had turned to a non-domestic German station 
had turned to the Saldatensender.69 
A campaign of this magnitude required technological innovation.  In order to 
carry out the synchronized broadcasts across all the territory they needed to cover, the 
British purchased from the Americans an RCA 500,000 kilowatt mammoth Aspidistra. 
The Aspidistra was the largest transmitter ever built, and from the moment it started 
broadcasting, the entire countries of France and Germany could be reached.  
Additionally, all other stations near its bandwidth could be bled out at a time when a 











Figure 2. 500,000 KW Aspidistra transmitter used against Germany.71 
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 In addition to the newly found broadcasting range, the British became extremely 
efficient in switching frequencies and cutting in on actual German radio stations, so that 
when signed off the air, the listeners could not discern between factual transmissions and 
enemy PSYOP.  As soon as a German transmission was complete with an actual 
evacuation order, the Soldatensender team would then break in with false instructions 
with alternate gathering points.  The final result of the programming had thousands of 
Germans on the roads of Germany making their way to fictitious rendezvous locations 
while impeding the movement of military units.  By the war’s end, Aspidistra would 
broadcasts on Radio Frankurts’s frequency for several hours each day when the real 
station was silenced because of air raids.  The fake broadcasts urged the citizens to 
evacuate as soon as possible or face death at the hands of the Allied war machine.72 
David Owen describes the situation at the wars end as “Germany alive with frightened 
people, marching they knew not where.”73 
 The lessons of World War II illustrated superb PSYOP tactics that were 
implemented by Nazis with incredible success in France and the Low Countries.  The 
British built on what the Germans started and soon began winning the air waves by 
imaginative programming that replicated host nation media and soon found its way into 
the actual host nation media of Germany itself.  The PSYOP campaign by the British had 
been a critical factor in dismantling the German war machine. Additionally, the lessons 
of World War II showed that despite successes in manipulating and replicating host 
nation media, it can also be twisted and used against your own country as the Germans 
found out. 
 C. THE KOREAN CONFLICT 
The Korean conflict had PSYOP advantages and disadvantages due to the exact 
culture and language shared by both North and South Korea.  In South Korea, there were 
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a plethora of host nation personnel and media that could be used against the North.  
However, the obvious disadvantage was the ability for the North to do exactly the same 
to the South.  The majority of the PSYOP effort was concentrated on coercing and 
keeping support within North and South Korea respectively, and then transitioned into 
targeting enemy military forces.  During the first five months of the war, enemy troops 
did not receive as much leaflet and broadcast attention as did the Republic of Korea 
civilians and soldiers; it was mainly PSYOP conducted on our allies to support their will 
to fight.74   
PSYOP operations by the U.S. military had screeched to a halt after the end of 
World War II as all military PSYOP units were completely disbanded.  Far more 
significantly, PSYOP instruction were removed from the Army training curriculum, 
schools, and from Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E).75  By the start of the 
Korean War in 1950, the U.S. was scrambling to assemble a patchwork PSYOP program 
that would be needed for the conflict. The upstart Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) 
which consisted of only 6 personnel, slowly built to a staff of 35 personnel by the 
summer of 1952.76  By that time, millions of PSYOP leaflets were being delivered by 
aircraft and howitzers to target audiences of North Koreans, South Koreans, and Chinese 
forces that invaded the Korean peninsula.77 
 From the start of the Korean War, U.S. PSYOP developed slowly and was 
generally unorganized, ad hoc, reactive, and was conducted with little host nation 
support.  Target audiences were not well known, which meant that there was little 
knowledge about appropriate themes, symbols, cultural nuances, and susceptibilities of 
Koreans and Chinese alike.  By the eve of the Korean War, a report on the status of 
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PSYWAR stated “that it was abundantly clear that the ‘know how’ of PSYWAR, gained 
in World War II, had largely vanished and was not set forth in writing, but was locked up 
in the minds of operators who had gone back to civilian pursuits…”78  
Given these constraints, the U.S. effort concentrated mainly on the quantity as 
opposed to the quality of PSYOP products.  The “throw manure on the wall and hope it 
sticks” mentality of developing PSYOP was the mantra from the beginning throughout 
midway through the war.  Overall, very little thought was given to the PSYOP products 
as the push to get as many leaflets out was the order of the day.79  During the early 
phases, the concentration of PSYOP was focused towards the South Korean populace and 
military due to the rapid push by the Communists.  Many of the themes at the beginning 
of the war were aimed at convincing the South to hold on and to keep on fighting.80 As 
the war went on, U.S. PSYOP efforts began to improve dramatically. A critical advance 
was  the “realization that surrender or  defection  was a  sequential process.”  As a  result,  
 
Figure 3. “The UN Troops Treat Them Good”81 
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the “themes of homesickness, loneliness, fear of death and safety like the leaflet below  
were used to ‘soften up’ enemy troops for surrender.”82 
Throughout the war, many of the millions of PSYOP leaflets that were being 
dropped on the enemy soon began to be augmented with limited radio broadcasts that 
utilized Koreans in the PSYOP effort.  The first radio station was set up in the destroyed 
American embassy in Seoul on October 4, 1950. This station began its broadcasts with 
with General Douglas MacArthur's demand that Kim Il-Sung, the chief of the North 
Korean troops, surrender.  As battle lines changed and the Korean War progressed, the 
station broadcast from mobile trucks and had many names such as: Radio Kilroy, Radio 
Vagabond, Radio Comet and Radio Mercury.83 Such radio stations, albeit possessing a 
small daily broadcast cycle compared to the Soviets and the Chinese, along with the 
hundreds of millions of leaflets dropped began to have moderate success with getting 
North Koreans and Chinese to surrender.  The Army contract study, PSYWAR in Korea, 
interrogated 2,728 POWs on one occasion; 904 claimed that PSYWAR print and 
broadcast were responsible for their surrender. A smaller sampling of 561 POWs reported 
that no less then 377 attributed to a PSYOP product or loudspeaker.84   In fact PSYOP 
has been credited with over 100,000 Chinese and North Korean surrenders by the end of 
the war and one third of all POWs interviewed expressed that they had been influenced 
by UN PSYWAR85 
One major problem that affected PSYOP in Korea was the fluid battlefield.  
During the war, Seoul was captured twice as battle lines went back and forth.  The effect 
was troublesome on the establishment of radio stations that needed static transmitters and 
antenna towers to operate.  The problem was thus solved by utilizing mobile radio 
stations as the one pictured below that comprised of PSYOP personnel and host nation 
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personnel to man the radio station.  Perhaps the only drawback was the lack of continuity 
and stability that limited air time significantly.  However, radio in Korea played a pivotal 
role due to the rates of illiteracy that was prevalent throughout the North Korean and 
Chinese ranks.  It is estimated that 30% of the North Korean soldiers, based on POW 
camp observation were functionally illiterate, which obviously made PSYOP via radio a 
valuable commodity.86  In reaction to the instability of the war front early on, PSYOP 
broadcasts were augmented by strategic broadcasts from Tokyo. Over 19 medium and 
shortwave broadcasters were being used to transmit PSYOP programs to Korea.  With the 
infusion of host nation assets, personnel, and committed resources from the UN, 
broadcasts later in the war were considerably more sophisticated and ecumenical, adding 
cultural programs, commentaries, and even soap operas to their schedules.87   
 
 
Figure 4. The Army's Armed Forces Radio Service began as a mobile clandestine 
radio stations during the Korean War.88 
 
 By April of 1952, three organizations were conducting PSYOP operations in the 
battle for Korea.  Strategic PSYOP was conducted by the Psychological Warfare Section, 
GHQ, FECOM, in Tokyo. The Psychological Warfare Division, G-3, Eighth Army, 
eventually located in Seoul, conducted operational and tactical PSYOP with the help of 
139 military, civilian and indigenous personnel (which included 10 professional Chinese  
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and Korean translators and interviewers).89  Consolidation activities (dissemination of 
war and morale news in an attempt to bring piece by convincing the populace to support 
their government) were conducted by the State Department’s U.S. Information Service,  
based in Pusan.90  Three of these PSYOP efforts utilized host nation personnel and assets, 
and were starting to have success against the North Koreans and Chinese. This is 
evidenced by increasing percentages of enemy POWs responding to PSYOP messages.   
As the war progressed and the Communists were driven north, further studies 
showed 68 percent of Chinese Communist and 65 percent of North Korean POWs 
responded that they had been influenced by U.S. PSYOP.  Of the voluntary surrenders 
the figures were no less than 90 percent of the Chinese and 77 percent of the North 
Koreans.91 Clearly the message was getting out on multiple levels while studies across 
the board were showing positive results. Additionally, in terms of operational PSYOP, 
the capture of Seoul boosted the tactical PSYOP programs in the mainland. One 50 
kilowatt transmitter was broadcasting in the medium wave, a 10 kilowatt in the 
shortwave, and to reach Pyongyang, a 500 kilowatt transmitter was utilized to broadcast 
PSYOP messages.  The lynchpin of the broadcasts was the successful application of host 
nation media personnel to such information platforms that the target audiences identified 
with.92   
 In addition to radio broadcast, utilizing host nation media personnel also had a 
huge part in the millions of leaflets that were dropped in North and South Korea.  As the 
war progressed, so did the effectiveness of leaflets that were dropped due to the influence 
of utilizing Korean and Chinese personnel.  This was evidenced by the similar leaflets
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used against the UN personnel that were increasing in effectiveness and quality.93  One 
leaflet that was directed at black soldiers was effective in terms of targeting the American 
vulnerability of inequality and race:  
LEST YOU FORGET!....Between January 1950 and June 1951, 85 
negroes have been lynched in the United States….NEGRO SOLDIERS!  
You’ve got a fight on your hands at home…94   
 
Conversely, there were plenty of U.S. and UN PSYOP products that were 
unsuccessful due to the lack of cultural knowledge in producing them.  An example was a 
leaflet produced for New Year’s Eve 1952, showing a traditional Chinese family feast, 
with a ghost-like soldier at the table, and the caption “Your place Will Be Empty.” 
Americans with Chinese experience criticized the product due to the gross inaccuracies.  
The food was arranged in the wrong order, incorrect seating arrangements, the family 
would be too rich to have a son in the army, and the display of a bountiful feast was quite 
confusing.  Additionally, the ghost was Caucasian in appearance. Such errors in products 
were immediately discredited by the enemy if the details were wrong, thus taking the 
seriousness immediately away from the product.  It begs the question, would the Chinese 
really believe the entire concept and proposal of the product if the sender could not even 
get the minor details right?  The answer is obviously no.  Had the product been filtered 
through properly selected host nation personnel or cultural experts, the leaflet would have 
at the least gotten the point across and possibly be effective.95  
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Figure 5. (Your Place Will Be Empty) Korean War Leaflet 711596 
 
Through trial and error, leaflets started to progress from standard behavior 
modification products to actual two sided newspaper clipping that provided objective and 
factual events concerning news about the Korean War as well as global news.  Since 
reliable news was hard to come by, the leaflet newspaper was greatly received by the 
Communists forces.  The most popular were the United Nations newspaper leaflets of: 
Parachute News, Free World News, Free World Weekly Digest, Free Korea, and 
Rehabilitation News.97 Below is an example of a product containing objective news 
mixed with PSYOP.  It reads: “United Nations Troops Break Red Offensive, Red 
Timetables Falter, Red Troops Starving, UN Air Force Bolstered, and Netherlands to 
send Forces to Korea.” 
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Figure 6. Parachute News No. 11 Korea 1952.98 
 
 By the wars end, there were a thousand days of radio broadcasts, tens of 
thousands of loudspeaker appeals, and billions of PSYOP leaflets.  Overall, historians 
have argued back in forth as to the effectiveness of PSYOP during the Korean War.  
There is no doubt that the brutal combat condition for the communists fighter coupled 
with PSYOP had an enormous effect on surrendering.  Many surrendered because “food 
was scarce, equipment was barely adequate, shelter and medical were practically non-
existent, and many soldiers pressed into combat were lonely, were missing their families, 
and did not know what they were fighting for.” Soldiers would often eat their cotton from 
their medical kits and UN forces would be alarmed to see Korean and Chinese soldiers 
attack en masse without rifles in the hopes of picking one up from their dead comrades or 
enemy.99 This led to staggering losses for the communists while providing an angle for 
PSYOP to exploit the themes of why they were fighting, and why were they dying for the 
Russians?100 
The extent to which the Koreans or Chinese adhered to the U.S. and UN PSYOP 
programs and campaigns is debatable due to all ambient factors related to combat, 
however the studies and polls throughout the war greatly supported the overall worth of 
PSYOP with the pillar being host nation support. The PSYOP campaigns combined 
American resources with Korean and Chinese culture and language that could be easily 
understood by the target audiences. As a result, the host nation assets added authenticity 
and relevance, as well as a greater chance of the products ‘sinking in’.   
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Overall, there is no doubt that Americans with very little language and knowledge 
of the Korean and Chinese culture could have had as much success had they not used host 
nation personnel and media assets.  Such is evident by another final report that 
concluded: 
The amount of PW (PSYWAR) received by the target audienceappears to 
be a definite causal factor in producing disaffection behavior and 
willingness to surrender…Psychological Warfareacting even without the 
‘favorable’ influences of lower moraleand lesser battle experience tends to 
influence disaffection behavior.101 
 
 PSYOP was proven as a combat multiplier and paid for itself many times over.  A 
study on the cost of prosecuting the Korean War determined that it “took about $1,100-
$1,200 to garner one POW by way of PSYWAR, contrasted to an Eighth Army estimate 
of $150,000 for each enemy soldier killed, a 70:1 ratio in favor of PSYWAR.102   
D. THE VIETNAM CONFLICT 
 The 1960s and the Vietnam War are considered to be when radio, television and 
PSYOP truly converged.  President Kennedy was a believer in "unconventional war," that 
is guerilla war, and as such he increased CIA funding to target Vietnam and Cuba as well 
as establishing the Green Berets.  The war saw one of the most intensive PSYOP 
campaigns ever executed, far surpassing any PSYOP effort in World I, II, and Korea.103  
In World War II there were 1,000 personnel conducting PSYOP, in Korea there war 600 
personnel with 130 host nation Koreans and Chinese.  In Vietnam, the numbers ballooned 
to over 1,200 personnel and over 750 indigenous Vietnamese conducting PSYOP with an 
annual budget over 12 million dollars.104 Additionally, because PSYOP was a priority 
with the Kennedy and Johnson administration, it became a priority with various inter-
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agencies involved in PSYOP such as: the State Department, USAID (United States 
Agency for International Development), CIA, MACV (Military Assistance Command- 
Vietnam, and the USIA (United States Information Agency).105  Essentially, the U.S. 
would not be caught with the abysmally low number of 6 personnel conducting PSYOP 
as in the start of Korean War. 
To coordinate all the agencies, President Johnson oversaw the development of the 
JUSPAO (Joint United States Public Affairs Office. The Chief of JUSPAO, Barry 
Zorthian, who was also the director of USIA, was appointed in May of 1965.  His job was 
to upstart and promote the Government of Vietnam radio, TV, motion picture, 
information services, as well as his normal duties of directing the USIA with information 
and cultural programs.106 On the South Vietnamese side, the government established the 
General political warfare directorate.  However, there were problems from the start of the 
war. This was mainly due to differing priorities between South Vietnam and the U.S., 
questionable and corrupt personnel, as well as a fear that the Vietnamese had of being 
controlled by the U.S. Additionally, between 1964 and 1971, there were 12 different 
ministers of information in that time period.  That created considerable problems with 
maintaining stability within the organization.  As a result, the U.S. circumvented the 
Vietnamese government and began to engage the Vietnamese people on their own.107   
By 1966, the U.S. began to fund dissemination outlets for PSYOP by starting and 
funding a seven-station radio network in South Vietnam.  When these transmitters were 
not being used to broadcast overt messages to the North, they were used to broadcast 
"black" clandestine stations that claimed to be from the Communists.  A declassified 
interdepartmental task-force memo in 1966 argued for an increase in these broadcasts as 
well as all forms of media in order to "harass the Communists and to maintain (the anti- 
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Communist) morale of the North Vietnamese population.” Additionally, the use of host 
nation personnel would be emphasized in bettering PSYOP products. 108   
Just as in the author’s experience in Iraq (OIF), host nation translators and 
journalists became extremely adept in the PSYOP development process because they did  
it on a daily basis.109  In Vietnam, PSYOP leaflets with the exception of a few 
specialized ones were conducted by Vietnamese locals under the supervision of JUSPAO 
or the 4th POG (Airborne).110  The products were then checked by both U.S. and 
Vietnamese PYSOP officers for three basic criteria: 1) Does it follow present policy 
guidance, 2) Is it credible and culturally acceptable?, and 3) Is it grammatically correct 
and understandable? The final testing was with POWs or civilians who most closely 
approximated the target audience.111  Overall, there is credible evidence that the system 
did keep PSYOP products consistent, concise, correct, and followed the guidance of 
JUSPAO.112 
However, most PSYOP efforts in the grand scheme were virtually ineffective due 
to the success of the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) and Viet Cong in dictating when 
and where they would fight.  Additionally, when enemy forces did fight, seldom were the 
enemy pursued, thus enforcing the mentality of survivability within the enemy ranks, 
further decreasing the pressure to surrender. Additionally, the North Vietnamese 
conducted the most important type of PSYOP, face to face communication.  While the 
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U.S. and South Vietnamese were busy producing and delivering billions of leaflets, and 
hundreds of thousands of magazines, newspapers, posters, broadcasts, pamphlets, et al, 
the Viet Cong were executing the tactics of Mao;113 going from hamlet to hamlet to 
indoctrinate the local populace while establishing a presence that was coercive in 
nature.114   
Overall, the lack of success that PSYOP had, was not because of the actual 
PSYOP being ineffective, it was rather that the enemy was not convinced that the PSYOP 
messages were credible due to the their success in the jungles and tunnels of Vietnam as 
well as coercing the local populace to support them and replenish their ranks.115 The 
politics that inhibited attacks on North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia allowed the enemy 
safe haven without the fear of ground pursuit or air attacks.  The North Vietnamese, 
because they could pick and choose when and where they wanted to fight, did not have to 
suffer though constant barrages, continuous attacks, and the everyday battlefield elements 
that put American PSYOP at an immediate advantage in previous wars. By the wars end, 
the amount of enemy personnel that had surrendered to the Americans and South 
Vietnamese was miniscule in both actual numbers and in comparison to the surrender 
numbers that the U.S. had enjoyed in previous wars.116   
In contrast, it was the North Vietnamese who delivered a more lethal 
psychological blow due to the overwhelming effects of the PSYACTS (Psychological 
Acts) produced by U.S. personnel killed and the tactical disaster but strategic success of 
the Tet Offensive in 1968.117  Tet caught the Americans completely by surprise and 
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resulted in several key towns such as Hue being overrun by the North.  The offensive 
opened up with 84,000 North Vietnamese and VC attacking isolated border areas of Con 
Thien, Loc Ninh, Dak To, Khe Sanh and then evolved into attacks upon 60 district cites 
throughout Vietnam. Khe Sanh was particularly riveting because many observers 
remarked on its similarity to the siege of the French disaster at Dien Bien Phu.118 
However, after a few days in some cites and several weeks in others, the Americans and 
South Vietnamese forces began to overtake them after bitter fighting.  In Saigan, which 
until Tet had been impervious to the war, enemy suicide squads delivered crippling blows 
to government installations.  The once quiet city of Hue was the most effected by the Tet 
offensive with over 3,000 of its residents massacred by the North Vietnamese.119 
 By the end of February 1968, the North Vietnamese were soundly defeated.  The 
North had sustained a staggering 40,000 casualties compared to 500 for the Americans 
and South Vietnamese combined. General Westmoreland had announced that the 
Communists were defeated and that nowhere in Vietnam did the occupants of the invaded 
cities welcome the North as liberators.120  But there were other consequences that would 
be strategic in scope that would forever change the perception of the war.  For one, the 
offensive added six hundred thousand more people in the South to the rolls of refugees.  
The most severe was the perception of the war within the United States. Over the 
previous year, President Johnson had reassured the American public that the Communists 
forces were defeated did not pose an invading threat to the South, and were firmly in 
command of the tempo of the war.  Now the war pictures (like the two below) and 
footage transmitted into American living-rooms of combat in the embassy garden, several 
hundred Americans killed, a war spiraling out of control, as well as doubts about the 
administration’s claims of military progress.121  Finally, in demonstration of how 
thoroughly the message had penetrated American consciousness, following the Tet 
Offensive on 27 February 1968, Walter Cronkite closed with: "Report from Vietnam: 
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Who, What, When, Where, Why?" He expressed his view to the nation that the war was 
un-winnable, and that the United States would have to find a way out.122 
   
Figure 7. (American casualty at Khe Sanh and an execution of a Viet Cong).123 
 
At Tet, Ho Chi Minh had essentially turned a devastating tactical and operational 
defeat into a strategic psychological victory.  He benefited from the Western press 
covering the offensive and utilized the American host nation media to deliver constant 
psychological barrages to the American public.  Such images became the focal point for 
protests throughout college campuses, raised doubts among ordinary American citizens, 
placed a considerable amount of political pressure to begin withdrawing from Vietnam, 
and ended the credibility of President Johnson and his chance for a second term.124  
Worse off, the images from the home-front had a psychological effect on the average 18 
year old who was just ‘doing his or her duty.’  Lastly, it made psychological operations in 
Vietnam even more challenging then it ever had been because of the enemies’ benefit 
from strategic PSYOP. 
It is ironic that in Korea, a small scale PSYOP operation was able to have success 
due to cold, exposed, battle ravaged, and starving North Koreans and Chinese. In 
Vietnam, a large scale PSYOP operation did not have the battlefield conditions to 
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capitalize on because the battle space involved the hamlets and villages of Vietnam 
which the North could easily manipulate.125  Most importantly, the dominance of 
strategic PSYOP by the NVA and VC diminished the U.S. will to fight on a national 
level.  Amazingly, staggering losses and a decisive defeat for the Communists was 
enough to produce a strategic PSYOP effect that influenced the war; this was evidenced 
by Johnson placing a ceiling on troop levels as well as de-escalating the air campaign in 
North Vietnam.126 
 Regardless of the strategic psychological boost that Tet gave to the North, an 
enormous amount of resources, manpower, and host nation personnel contributed to 
many successful U.S. PSYOP programs that were very effective in themselves on a 
tactical and operational level, even if they failed to turn the tide and help the U.S. win the 
larger conflict.  An example is the amount of surrenders of VC and NVA soldiers in 
1967-68 under the Chieu Hoi surrender program.  It is estimated that 29,276 NVA / VC 
(the equivalent of 95 infantry battalions) surrendered to MACV or ARVN forces.  At the 
time, MACV estimated that eliminating an equivalent force via conventional means 
would have cost the U.S. 6,000 dead and many more wounded.127 
Such successes of the Chieu Hoi programs were from millions of PSYOP leaflets, 
PSYOP loudspeaker teams with host nation translators, as well as radio and TV 
programs. However, JUSPAO quickly realized that radio was limited because there were 
parts of Vietnam where the populace did not possess radios much less TVs. There needed 
to be diversity within the PSYOP mediums as opposed to just dumping millions of 
leaflets throughout the countryside due to the civilians and the Communists military 




                                                 
125 “The Battle for Hue, Vietnam”. Military Channel, (Television Documentary, 2007). Viewed 26 
January 2007. 
126 Phillip Davidson. (MG, USA, Retired). Vietnam at War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), 483. 
127 Paul Valley (COL U.S Army). “From PSYOP to Mind War”, (Presidio of San Francisco, CA: 
Headquarters 7th PSYOP Group, United States Army Reserve), page 4.  “Chieu Hoi” The Winning Ticket”. 
MACV Command Information Pamphlet, 6-69, March 1969. 
45 
a VC who launches mortar rounds at U.S. camps by night.  It was necessary to maximize 
all means of communication to get a repetitive pro U.S. and pro South Vietnamese 
message to as many civilians as possible.128   
One solution was to provide thousands of radios and television sets that would be 
set to South Vietnamese radio stations such as Voice of Freedom (Tiêng Nói Tu Do), 
Mother of Vietnam ((Me Viêt Nam), and the Sacred Sword of Patriotism ((Gýõm Thiên 
Ái Quôc).129 The radios would then be air dropped, floated down rivers, distributed 
throughout the major cities, and would contain PSYOP material to convince the local 
populace that the radios were not harmful or contained explosives per the North 
Vietnamese.  One example of this campaign can be found in the leaflet reproduced 
below: “This girl is picking up the white package containing a radio from the 
Government of the Republic of Vietnam. She is not afraid to pick it up because she 
knows the radio will bring her and her family knowledge and entertainment.”130 
 
Figure 8. Leaflet HQ-8-68.131 
 
 The distribution of radios was a clever move by the Americans because it gave the 
target audiences a voice from their countrymen.  Radio soon began to play PSYOP 
messages to 95% of the country around the clock. The Americans tapped into the U.S. 
funded local radio stations and began utilizing them as a medium for deploying PSYOP  
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messages.  Essentially, the American PSYOP personnel would formulate the direction 
and campaign, and the Vietnamese would provide the on air voice and personality as 
pictured below.132  
 
Figure 9. PSYOP radio broadcast in Vietnam.133 
 
Throughout the war, a number of Allied radio stations broadcast messages 
throughout Vietnam. The Ministry of Defense in Saigon operated the Voice of Freedom 
with transmitters in Hue. The Americans provided financial, technical and advisory 
assistance to the Vietnamese broadcasters. Some other stations broadcasting to the 
Vietnamese were Radio Saigon, the Voice of America, and the British Broadcasting 
Corporation. 134 
In addition to the use of radio stations, PSYOP programs capitalized on the 
vulnerabilities of the Vietnamese culture such as messages that emphasized 
superstitions.135  In the Vietnamese culture, one such superstition was the belief in the 
wandering soul.  The Vietnamese believe that the dead must be buried in their homeland, 
or their soul will wander aimlessly in pain and suffering.  According to these beliefs, if a 
person is improperly buried, his or her soul wanders constantly.  During the war, an 
attempt was made to use this belief against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong.  Since  
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it was clear that they would die far from home, their bodies would probably never be 
found or properly buried, it was certain that they would become a wandering soul after 
death.136 
 The operation was code-named "Wandering Soul." Engineers spent weeks 
recording eerie sounds. They were similar to the sounds employed during a scary radio 
show or movie; they were very creepy and designed to send shivers down the back. These 
cries and wails were intended to represent souls of the enemy dead who had failed to find 
the peace of a proper burial. The wailing soul cannot be put to rest until this proper burial 
takes place. The purpose of these sounds was to panic and disrupt the enemy and cause 
him to flee his position.137 Helicopters were used to broadcast Vietnamese voices 
pretending to be from beyond the grave. They called on their "descendents" in the 
Vietcong to defect and cease fighting. This campaign played the sounds and messages all 
night in order to spook the superstitious enemy. Despite eventually realizing that they  
were hearing a recording beamed from a helicopter, the enemy gunners could not help 
but fear that their souls would some day end up moaning and wailing in a similar fashion 
after death.138 
{Funeral Music and the Wailing Sounds of a Moaning Ghost}  
{The Daughter "Hai" Crys Out for Her Father}  
Daddy, daddy, come home with me, come home. Daddy! Daddy! 
{The Ghost Father Responds}  
! Hai ! 
Who is that? Who is calling me? My daughter? My wife? 
Your Father is back home with you, my daughter 
Your Husband is back home with you, my wife 
But my body is gone. I am dead, my family  
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Tragic ... how tragic  
My friends, I come back to let you know that I am dead ... I am dead 
I am in Hell ... just Hell 
It was a senseless death. How senseless ... how senseless 
But when I realized the truth, it was too late ... too late  
Friends ... while you are still alive ... 
There is still a chance that you can be reunited with your loved ones 
Do you hear what I say?  
Go home ... Go home friends 
Hurry ... If not, you will end up like me 
Go home my friends before it is too late…Go home! ... Go home friends!  
! Ve Di ! ... ! Ve Di Ban ! 
!! VE DI !! ... !! VE DI !!  
{More Moans From the Afterlife}139 
 Like similar PSYOP programs and campaigns, the use of host nation personnel 
was the critical lynchpin in delivering a product that really hit home and delivered an 
instant connection to the target audience.  Below are some of the translators and radio 
journalists that worked on The Wondering Soul project. 
 
Figure 10. Vietnamese Journalist produce The Wondering Soul recordings140 
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 As The Wondering Soul project took hold, a common occurrence happened every 
time the recordings were played, it always drew enemy gunfire.  In Vietnam, drawing 
enemy gunfire was one of the most difficult things to achieve because the enemy was 
trained to fire when it favored them the most.  However, The Wondering Soul recordings 
made them fire out of emotion and fear, which is just what the U.S. military in the air and 
ground wanted.  An excerpt from an AC-130 Specter Gunship (Spooky) crewmember 
who flew with an accompanying C-47 stated that: “we stumbled on to a Battalion-sized 
Viet Cong force and they were bold enough open fire when they heard the recordings.  Of 
course that was what we wanted.  Over the Commanding Officer’s objection I scheduled 
our C-47 for a repeat visit over the same target.  The next night they went up again, but 
what I wasn’t told until later was that Spooky went along with our aircraft and flew the 
speaker mission in opposing orbit and all blacked out.  When our aircraft played the 
recording, the ground fire erupted again and Spooky “hosed em” with all three cannon in 
full cyclic rpm.”141  Another excerpt from an unknown VC stated: “these audio messages 
were hard to ignore, for the sound even penetrated through the earth to VC hidden in the 
underground tunnels.”142  This was considered a positive MOE since it effected the 
behavior and decision cycle of the target audience by causing them to go against his 
normal routine of firing at the Americans when it best suited them.  Instead, the PSYOP 
message elicited an emotional response that caused them to fire at the Americans only to 
be decimated by patrolling AC-130s with their counter fire.143 
 Like The Wondering Soul project, there were thousands of other PSYOP 
programs during the long conflict in Vietnam, and like most military operations in 
Vietnam, went through its trials and errors as well. However, PSYOP alone was not 
destined to win the Vietnam Conflict.  As effective as many of the PSYOP programs 
were in meeting their specific goals, in order to affect the larger war effort, they needed 
to play off of the situation happening on the ground.  In this case, the war on the ground  
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failed to disrupt the North Vietnamese from controlling the battlefield and gaining 
support from the Vietnamese populace. The end result was a populace that became 
coerced and institutionalized by the Communists forces exacerbated by the U.S. refusal to 
break the cycle of support coupled with a media nightmare that crippled America’s 
resolve to continue the war.  Naturally, PSYOP would then be relegated to convincing 
hardened soldiers and a controlled populace to an unrealistic alternative. However, 
despite the un-permissive environment, PSYOP programs as a whole, made the most of 
what they could and incorporated host nation assets with much success.  In turn the use of 
host nation assets gave PSYOP its greatest posture for success in Vietnam.144 
E.       OPERATION DESERT STORM 
 Operation Desert Storm introduced a new element into the PSYOP world: it was 
the first war to be covered on a global scale, 24 hours a day.  Such news coverage turned 
certain aspects of host nation media upside down by the mere aspect that local news 
could become global news in a flash.  This put the news media as a major player in the 
conflict and instantly placed the war in a media fishbowl with the eyes of the world 
watching.  Both Iraq and the U.S. saw the news media as an arm to their strategic PSYOP 
reach due to the coverage that it commanded.  In the months preceding as well as during 
the conflict, both Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and U.S. officials used CNN as somewhat 
of a diplomatic back channel, sending complex signals to each other and to their 
respective publics at the same time.145  This resulted in a high stakes media chess game 
with PSYOP being a major force provider in all phases: strategic, operational, and 
tactical. 
The effectiveness of PYSOP during Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT 
STORM was made evident by its dramatic effect that spurned many of the enemy 
soldiers to surrender.  The images were then seen on news footage around the world of 
scores of Iraqis with their hands raised, with many holding PSYOP leaflets. PSYOP was 
used so effectively during the Gulf War that an estimated 87,000 Iraqi soldiers 
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surrendered.146  However, PSYOP alone was not the reason that thousands of soldiers 
surrendered. Instead, PSYOP was the tipping point, that extra edge that forced enemy 
soldiers that were exposed to horrendous barrages from U.S. military platforms to 
surrender.  Unlike Vietnam, where the enemy was afforded safe haven both politically 
and geographically, Iraqi soldiers were exposed in the open desert to be picked off 
systemically by massive firepower from coalition forces. However, the success of 
PYSOP was not merely happenstance, it was precipitated by a PYSOP force structure 
that was deployed to the region far before hostilities commenced.147 
With the U.S. being caught unprepared for PSYOP in previous engagements, the 
4th PSYOP Group was deployed to the Gulf region to avoid such a similar mistake.  As 
quickly as 11 August 1990, nine days after the invasion of Iraq, a cell of 12 PSYOP 
specialists, under the supervision of the commander of the 4th POG (A), COL Anthony 
Normand, assembled at MacDill AFB, Florida, the headquarters of the joint services U.S. 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to commence strategic PSYOP planning for 
possible operations in Southwest Asia. The coordinated PSYOP plan took into account 
the cultures, languages, and sensibilities of the people of Southwest Asia.  Such planning 
ahead paid dividends because it also prepared and coordinated for host nation media  
support that would be advising U.S. forces on leaflets, various print products, as well as 
arranging host nation personnel to broadcast PSYOP messages via television and 
radio.148 
However, Saddam Hussein quickly gained the momentum on strategic PSYOP 
after requested PSYOP directives specified by General Norman Schwarzkopf were 
categorically denied by various agencies and staffing bureaucracy within DoD due to 
sensitivities to Coalition partners.  Schwarzkopf’s patience was wearing thin as he stated 
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rather pointedly on 20 December 1990 that “Psychological Operations are going to be 
absolutely critical, critical part of any campaign that we must get involved in.”149 
Precious weeks and months passed as Saddam Hussein soon began disseminating 
his own strategic PSYOP as well as trying to convince his fellow Middle Eastern 
countries that the invasion was another example of an infidel crusade.  His strategic 
PSYOP had considerable success in mounting a campaign that reached a wide domestic 
and foreign audience.150 Within Iraq, all broadcast facilities were owned and operated by 
the Broadcasting and Television Organization of the MCI.  Prior to the invasion, Iraqi 
broadcast capabilities included two prime-time television broadcasts, two domestic radio 
services – “Baghdad Domestic Service” and “Voice of the Masses” (VOM) – and 
shortwave radio broadcasts of VOM in Kurdish, Turkoman, and Assyrian.151 
Shortly after the invasion, Iraq seized several Kuwaiti media centers and began 
operating the Provisional Free Kuwait Government Radio Program. They also 
implemented at least five additional shortwave radio programs destined to undermine the 
Saudi and Egyptian governments and the morale of Arab troops in the Gulf. However, 
coalition bombing raids soon started attacking the communication nodes of Iraq which 
completely destroyed their television capability as well as leaving Iraq with only two 
radio stations at reduced signal strength.152 Ever relentless, the Iraqis began to turn to 
foreign resources to get their message out.  The Iraqis aired clips via ARABSAT and 
INTELSAT as giving feeds to the international media via the Iraqi News Agency (INA).  
Additionally, Iraq invested in controlling media resources such as the “Voice of 
Palestinian Liberation Organization,” and the news agency Jana.  The result led to 
rallying officials of Palestine, Tunisia, Jordan, Yemen, Mauritania, and Sudan to issue a 
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joint statement endorsing the Iraqi position as well as organized ways to counter the 
Coalition’s media.153  At first, Iraq’s strategic PSYOP scheme was highly imaginative 
and did have some success.  Iraq’s use of PSYOP and the world media painted Iraq as a 
formidable foe. This led to an overestimation of Allied casualties that were far off the 
mark.154 
For all of Iraq’s successes in PSYOP at the start, they were slowly eroded by a 
series of mistakes that became laughable items throughout the world. Iraq’s version of 
Tokyo Rose would broadcasts that the wives of American soldiers were having an affair 
with the likes of Tom Cruise, Arnold Schwarzenegger, and Bart Simpson.155 Reacting to 
the ridiculous broadcasts, The British newspaper The Guardian wrote in 1991: 
BAGHDAD BETTY, Iraq's English-language radio service, has taken a 
credibility nosedive. Over the weekend Betty indulged in some 
mischievous bitchery by telling US soldiers that their wives back home 
were committing adultery by sleeping with movie stars. Big-screen 
heartthrobs like Tom Cruise, Arnold Schwarzenegger and Bart Simpson. 
The first two might have presented some cause for anxiety, but who 
initiated the deviant practice of molesting under-age, primary coloured 
cartoon characters?  
 
Three months later, Baghdad Betty would be sacked after she became the object 
of laughter and ridicule throughout the media world. The Iraqis continued to make further 
mistakes in their attempt to win the hearts and minds of the CNN audience. On 23 August 
1990, Saddam went on television with a young child named Stuart who was being held 
hostage during the Coalition bombing. Saddam thought that it showed his fatherly side. 
Americans and British viewers were incensed that he would use and frighten a child, and 
the Kuwaiti government-in-exile immediately prepared a brochure comparing Saddam 
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photograph of Saddam with the hostage, the brochure also depicted dead Shi’ite and 
Kurdish children, the destruction of buildings in Kuwait, and other illustrations of Iraqi 
inhumanity.156 
 
               
Figure 11. Similar depiction between Hitler and Hussein157 
     
Soon the Coalition forces were winning on three fronts: the lack of Iraqi 
credibility, the un-defendable Iraqi position of plundering Kuwait, and the sudden rise of  
the patriotic media in the United States.158  The U.S. benefited tremendously from a 
media that was friendly while demonizing Saddam Hussein at the same time.  The major 
syndicates showed “video postcards” from the war front- smiling soldiers sending love 
kisses to moms, dads, and girlfriends, as well as holiday greetings. Magazines and 
tabloids were equally patriotic. A New York Post headline read: UP YOURS. Newsweek’s 
read: BAGHDAD”S BULLY and the New York Times, of all newspapers, ran a special 
supplement of two African-American soldiers embracing, with one holding an American 
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flag.  The cumulative effect of such coverage was indicative to the war’s popularity of 
89% among the American populace.159  This gave the Coalition a tremendous advantage 
because not one of the media sources would dare question the administration or the way 
in which the war was prosecuted.   
Seizing upon the information initiative of the media, the 4th PSYOP Group began 
broadcasting the "VOICE OF THE GULF" (VOG) radio network on 19 January 1991. 
The VOG was a 100 man cell comprised of 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (A), British, 
Egyptian, and Kuwaiti representatives whose first mission was to encourage Iraqi “line 
crossers.”160 It operated continuously through 1 April 1991 with more than 210 hours of 
live broadcasting and 330 hours of prerecorded programs. A total of 2,072 news items 
were aired along with 189 PSYOP messages. The VOICE OF THE GULF network 
consisted of a 50 KW AM transmitter located at Abu Ali, Saudi Arabia broadcasting on 
AM 1134; a 10KW AM transmitter located at Qaisumah, Saudi Arabia broadcasting on 
AM 1179; a 1KW FM transmitter located at Qaisumah, Saudi Arabia broadcasting on FM 
87.5 and two Volant Solo EC-130 aircraft of the 193rd Special Operations Wing 
broadcasting on AM 690 and FM 88.5 and 87.9.161 Reports from Enemy Prisoners of 
War (EPWs) after the conflict were encouraging. Most believed it was a true Arabic radio 
station that encouraged them to surrender, and the VOG was the third most listened to 
radio station behind the BBC and Radio Monte Carlo.162 
Throughout the war the PSYOP radio programs were produced with the 
assistance of Kuwaiti exiles and Saudi Arabians, and shared transmitting facilities with 
two Armed Forces Desert Network radio station vans that broadcast to U.S. troops from 
Saudi Arabia.  Additionally, the U.S. Army and CIA helped to set up the radio stations: 
The Future and The Iraqi Broadcasting Corporation; two stations developed with host  
 
                                                 
159 Ibid. 
160 USACAPOC, Psychological Operations During Desert Shield / Storm: A Post Operational 
Analysis, 2d ed., revised (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 5 November 1993), 4-5.  
161  USACAPOC, Psychological Operations During Desert Shield / Storm: A Post Operational 
Analysis, 2d ed., revised (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 5 November 1993), 4-5.  
162  Ibid. 
56 
nation assets that also continued broadcasting long after Desert Storm.163  The audio and 
visual PSYOP programs drove home what the Iraqi soldiers were experiencing on the 
ground: destruction from Coalition ground forces, destruction from the air, most 
communication nodes destroyed, contributing to a sense that the situation was hopeless. 
US PSYOP messages sought to capitalize on the reality that the Iraqis experienced, 
driving it home with visuals such as the one below.  
 
 
Figure 12. Iraqis Surrendering.164   
 
 Use of host nation media was not limited to just broadcasting.  It was imperative 
that the Iraqi soldier and citizen be familiar with the visual products that they would 
encounter.  Drawings and pictures have uniqueness to themselves in the Middle East that 
is quite distinctive from Western illustration. To provide such an effect, the Coalition 
hired the Saudi Royal illustrator and well known cartoonists to draw leaflets that were 
then double checked by the Arab member of the Combined PSYOP cell.165  Such leaflets 
were then delivered to enemy soldiers and civilians in the millions.  The leaflets ranged 
from standard surrender pleas, brotherhood, or the inevitability of destruction if they 
continued to fight.  However, at no time did any PSYOP product in any form denigrate 
the Iraqi soldiers.  Learning from past mistakes in Vietnam, as well as past foes of the 
U.S. who denigrated the American fighting soldier, the U.S. portrayed the Iraqi soldier as 
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a brave good soldier that was led astray by the evil Saddam and who would be treated 
with dignity and respect upon leaving the one-sided fight.166   
 
Figure 13. Smiling Iraqi EPW; Surrender campaign leaflet.167 
 
 As short as the Gulf War was, it solidified the use of host nation media assets due 
to the lack of Arabic linguists in DoD and the U.S. Government.  Many Iraqis felt that 
listening to Arabic broadcasts that foretold their doom while bombs were raining from 
the sky was the worst morale killer they had faced.  The final analysis was quite telling. 
Overall, Coalition leaflet messages had gone out to 98 percent of the EPWs, 80 percent of 
whom had been influenced by it, and 70 percent of the EPWs had been influenced 
enough that it affected their surrender decision.  Radio gained 58 percent target exposure 
rate, of which 46 percent found it persuasive and 34 percent claimed it had a bearing on 
the surrender decision. 168  
F.       THE BALKANS 
 During the tumultuous period in the Balkans in the 1990s, hate was used as a 
catalyst to motivate people, while the use of host nation media was at the center.  
According to U.S. embassy staff, Slobodan Milosevic had used the state controlled media 
to inflame Serbian Christians against the Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo.  According to 
U.S. embassy staff, Serb soldiers began committing crimes because of the daily broadcast 
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of the manufactured atrocities of the Bosnian Muslims, provoking a desire among the 
Serb population to exact revenge.  Such fabricated stories tore into the core of the Serb 
populace by reporting exaggerated stories such as Muslims raping nuns and killing 
babies.  Slowly and methodically, the media was being used to enrage the Serbians and 
justify the ensuing genocide against Bosnians.169  
 During the Kosovo Conflict, the U.S. intensified the pressure on the Serbs by 
initiating a series of sanctions that included economic, diplomatic and ultimately - 
military action.  All three foreign policy alternatives were covered extensively by the 
news media.  In fact, the U.S. instituted the most concentrated media focus directed 
toward a single foreign country in its entire history.  Essentially, the media became a 
major partner to the military, economic, and diplomatic efforts that would ultimately win 
the Kosovo campaign.170 
 Since 1943, the U.S. had been utilizing host nation media and broadcasting in the 
Balkans as a media counter during World War II against the Nazi, the Cold War against 
the Eastern Bloc nations, and now against a Serb government determined to bring 
genocide to the Balkans.  At the center was the VOA (Voice of America) and RFE / RL 
(Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty that began broadcasting 40 hours of shortwave 
programming in Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian, Serbo-Croatian, and Serbian. However, 
since hostilities escalated, Milosevic began to shut down access to the local affiliates.  To 
counter, the State Department and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and NATO forces that consisted of: the U.S., Germany, UK, 
Romania, Turkey, Italy, France, Spain, and Poland stepped in and expanded the 
shortwave, medium wave, and internet transmissions in their specific assigned sectors of  
Kosovo.171  The result became known as the “ring of fire” around Serbia: Multinational 
Brigade Northeast (MNB-NE), Multi-national Brigade East, Multi-National Brigade  
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Southwest (MNB-SW), and Headquarters KFOR (HQ KFOR).172  In producing such a 
“ring of fire” within Kosovo, Milosevic unwittingly helped the Coalition when he shut 
down the local affiliates. The result was a clearing of the airwaves and made transmission 
into the region much less difficult.173 Soon a convergence of NATO countries began 
assembling an information campaign aimed at gaining support from the Serb populace 
and ultimately overthrowing Milosevic per the intent of the leaflet below. 
 
Figure 14. Leaflet 04-B-02-L005.174 
“War and sacrifice for you 
Good money for him, his family and his friends”. 
Serbia's economy is crippled; her war machine under attack. but through it 
all, Milosevic, his family, and his inner circle have managed to make 
millions. Tight control of state-run monopolies has given Milosevic an 
illicit financial empire at the expense of those he claims to defend. His son 
Marko waits out the war in comfort. He does not serve as ordinary Serbs 
must. While your sons and husbands fight, Marko Milosevic parties in 
Belgrade or works on his sun-tan at the family villa in the Mediterranean. 
Milosovic's nepotism, cronyism, and genocide in Kosovo have drained 
Serbia's economic resources and dragged the country into war with the 
world. Is he the kind of leader you really want?175 
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The challenge of overthrowing the Milosevic government meant conducting an 
extensive information campaign aimed at breaking support or indifference amongst the 
populace.  Working in concert with each other, the NATO counties worked with their 
respective host nation personnel in the form of journalists, broadcasters, music disk 
jockeys, translators, and cultural advisors.  The results were products and programs that 
were specific for the region, and specifically for the cultural make-up within their sector.  
Translators and journalists were also used in leaflet operations that consisted of over 100 
million being dropped on the Kosovo populace. However, PSYOP in Kosovo had 
negligible effects at the beginning of the conflict. Most notably, the Kosovo air campaign 
was used by Milosevic as a propaganda boost due to the unavoidable collateral damage as 
well as the unfortunate and embarrassing incident of the bombing of the Chinese 
embassy. 176  Additionally, the mass of cultures that consisted of the UN meant a mass of 
psychological products that ranged from being effective, ineffective, and even counter 
productive.177   
Despite the initial challenges, NATO did have a vast swath of visual, audio visual, 
and audio that dominated the information spectrum within Kosovo.  Additionally, just as 
in the case of DESERT STORM, the world media that was also being watched by  
Serbians, was demonizing the Milosevic government for its acts of atrocities as well as 
showing the unforgettable images of women and children helplessly fleeing towards 
Albania.178   
Once NATO established their perimeter boundaries, momentum in information 
operations began to take hold.  Susceptibilities, vulnerabilities, and cultural nuances 
became evident as well as an aggressive strategy that began to take hold to meet 
politicians, businessmen, station directors, newspaper outlets and various key 
communicators within their sector.  It was clearly evident, that the key to successful 
PSYOP in Kosovo was convincing the Serbians that the atrocities committed by the 
Milosevic regime were inhumane and blatantly wrong. Additionally, a key PSYOP 
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objective was also convincing the Albanians who comprised 90 percent of the population, 
not to retaliate for past atrocities as well as instilling faith that the new government would 
protect them.179  Additionally, in the American sector, a key PSYOP objective was 
targeting the youth of Kosovo to stop the cycle of violence and to accept each other as 
Kosovo citizens.  Overall, the key to PSYOP success was repetition, getting the message 
out on all channels, and avoiding ineffective general themes (lazy PSYOP) for the entire 
populace.  Specializing was the key as well as getting the right message, at the right time, 
to the right audience. 
 
Figure 15. NATO PSYOP composition and accompanying host nation media 
personnel.180 
 
 Such specializing in terms of dominant target audiences, key communicators, and 
the youth was and continues to be critical in Kosovo today.  In the American sector, CPT 
David Lloyd, OIC of the Kosovo PSYOP radio and broadcast cell, ran 10 radio and 2 
television contracts to broadcast in the MNB-E region that was south of Pristina.  All but 
1 radio station and 1 television station covered entertainment, news, weather, sports, and 
a mixture of PSYOP products for the majority Albanian target audience as well as the 
minority Serb populace  Many of the themes revolved around a safe and secure 
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environment, ethnic tolerance, legitimacy, peaceful coexistence with the Serbian 
populace as well as preventing revengeful sectarian violence. 181  These included a TV 
program in Strpce, a radio show in the town between the American base at Camp 
Bondsteel and Gnjillane, and one in Vitina.  A critical lynchpin was “our interpreters 
listening to the programs to ensure that they were promoting messages consistent with 
our themes.”182   
 The most successful programs from the American sector were “Media day” and 
and “remote broadcast.”  Media day consisted of advertising and selecting the top honors 
kids from various high schools that consisted of half being Serb and half being Muslim 
Albanian in a intercultural event.  The students would then collaborate together in a 
magazine called K Teen that was in itself a PSYOP product designed for the younger 
target audience produced by the brightest kids in MNB-E; the future of Kosovo.  The 
PSYOP product was a win-win because it was produced under supervision by the actual 
target audience and then distributed nation-wide to their peer age group.183   
Equally effective, “remote broadcast” consisted of PSYOP personnel, translators, 
and broadcasters that would go to an actual radio station and would play live music 
interjected with PSYOP messages of peaceful coexistence and legitimacy as well as hand 
out items such as: soccer balls, t-shirts, and stationary with PSYOP messages on them.  
Overall, the radio station owners, town mayors, and local populace welcomed such 
events as “remote broadcast” were quite popular and extensively requested in the major 
towns of Strpce, Gnjillane, and Vitina.184 
 So how effective was the amalgam of information operations ranging from 
magazines, newspapers, radio stations, television, face-to-face, “remote broadcast”, and 
the world press had on changing the culture in Kosovo?  Overall, the results achieved by 
the U.S. and NATO media effort was evident in a nationwide survey in October 2000 that 
showed the international media played a significant role in informing the Serbian people 
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during the crisis.  The poll showed that 40 percent of Serbian adults tuned to RFE / RL 
and the VOA for news during the elections and the beginning of the massive street 
demonstrations between September 24 and October 4 2000.185  During this time, more 
Serbs listened to RFE / RL (37 percent) than Radio Belgrade (31 percent).  On 3 October 
2000, the day before the demonstrations that overthrew Milosevic, 25 percent of Serbs 
tuned in to RFE / RL and 20 percent tuned in to the VOA.  Additionally, surveys by the  
Broadcasting Board of Governors also confirmed that international radio was used as a 
major source of information for the Kosovar refugees that fled to Albania during the 
conflict.186 
 Overall, the impact of the international media that was packaged and delivered in 
a Balkan tongue that was extremely pivotal in overturning the unfortunate events that had 
taken place.  Again as in previous information and psychological campaigns, it was the 
use of the host nation media assets, interpreters, journalists, and linguists that were the 
critical piece that broke the monopoly on the Milosevic state controlled media that had 
enflamed the populace to a path of genocide. 
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IV.  OIF / OEF 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During the cold war, the U.S. utilized the “United States Information Agency, 
Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, military special operations and psychological 
operations forces, covert propaganda and influence capabilities, and, not least, a 
Psychological Strategy Board in the White House to high level direction and 
coordination.”187 The result of all the investment in instruments of soft power painted the 
Soviet Union as evil and oppressive, while painting the U.S. more favorably.  
Unfortunately, the perceived lack of threat from a viable power during the post war era 
led to the dismantling of information apparatuses in the 1990s that had been 
painstakingly developed during years of fighting the Cold War. The effects of the shut 
down of agencies that took generations to establish their niche are still being felt today as 
the U.S. struggles to regenerate such soft power assets. 
 In the war in Iraq, it has appeared that painting the Iraqi government as legitimate, 
quelling the Ba’athist insurgency, as well as defeating Al Qaeda from an informational 
and a PSYOP perspective has been incredibly difficult to achieve.  A number of issues, 
such as the unpopularity of the war in Iraq, the Iraqi outlook on security, lack of 
electricity, gas shortages, the incidents at Abu Ghraib, and the perception of detainment 
facilities as instruments of torture, all have proven to be difficult roadblocks to overcome 
in the war of ideas.188  The difficulties are further exacerbated by Iraq and the fact that its 
neighboring countries already had pre-conceived notions of mistrust, dislike, and 
misgivings about U.S. foreign policy.  Equally challenging was the sectarian divide that 
plagued Iraq from the onset of the invasion.   
It has been well versed in the global media, polls, and in political punditry that the 
U.S. has diminished its popularity throughout the world, with the greatest unpopularity 
stemming from the Middle East.  According to a 2005 Pew study, 17 nations of various 
geographical locations were polled to determine global attitudes towards the U.S.  The  
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poll numbers showed waning numbers since 2000.  Not surprisingly, approval ratings 
were abysmally low within Middle Eastern nations and has decreased every year in Iraq 
since 2003189  
The total accumulation of all the negative aspects of anti-Americanism and the 
outright global rejection of the U.S. led invasion of Iraq has placed psychological 
operations at a disadvantage from the onset.  One cannot but compare the irony behind 
the juxtaposition of Operation DESERT STORM and OIF: in the first case it was easy to 
sell the idea of the war as being justifiable cause. This message was relatively easy to 
convince since the American approval rate of DESERT STORM was 89 percent while 
the global approval rate was 75% in the early 1990s, compared to approval ratings in the 
twenties and single digit percentages in the Middle East for OIF.190 Such waning 
numbers in terms of the general attitudes towards the United States presents a strategic 
PSYOP dilemma.  Consequently, it places a tremendous burden on operational and 
tactical PSYOP which depends heavily on the credibility of the United States.  At all 
levels of PSYOP, convincing specific target audiences of an idea is a lot harder if the rest 
of the world does not believe in what the U.S. is doing, especially in Iraq where the target 
audiences are privy to BBC and CNN. 
Anti-Americanism within the Arab world has placed a wall between 
psychological operations and the Arab target audience.  In much of the Arabic media, 
negative rumors about Americans abound. To provide a few examples, these rumors 
include the following: American soldiers harvest organs from dying Iraqis; Washington 
caused the Indian Ocean tsunami in order to kill Muslims; and American soldiers possess 
special sunglasses that can see through women’s clothes.191 Such negative repetitive 
sensationalism coupled with the stigma of support for Israel has put a serious drain on 
winning over the Middle Eastern target audience.  When coupled with the fact that the 
U.S. still has a conventional force of 150,000 military personnel stationed in Iraq, that  
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these forces have worn out their welcome, and the negative media attention following 
American missteps (Abu Ghraib and Haditha, for example), the situation becomes even 
more difficult in the war of ideas..   
Despite these strategic inadequacies, there are PSYOP programs that are bringing 
positive results to Iraq at the nation-wide and lower level.  The adoption of the 
constitution and the democratic processes that resulted in a democratically elected 
government was a major milestone that was supported by an extensive PSYOP plan from 
the 4th POG (Airborne) JPOTF,  STRATCOM and the United Nations (through UNAMI, 
the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq), that have been instrumental in changing 
perceptions.   In terms of capturing high value targets (HTVs) PSYOP was at the 
forefront delivering products in every medium imaginable.  A tips hotline run by the U.S. 
military has led to the arrest of hundreds of key former Ba’athists and Al Qaeda and the 
eventual bombings that finally killed Zarqawi. Such programs were and continue to be 
highly dependent on host nation media.   
 In regards to OEF, this chapter will examine the utility of the Merlin shortwave 
broadcast system.  A strategic PSYOP shortwave radio program designed to give news, 
entertainment, and PSYOP messages to the AFGHAN populace.  Merlin is unique as it is 
produced by host nation personnel from Fort Bragg, NC, sent to the British company VT 
Merlin in London, and then sent via powerful shortwave transmitters to Afghanistan and 
beyond.192  
B. PSYOP / PHASE I OIF 
 The start of the PSYOP campaign in Iraq started months prior to the March 
invasion and it consisted of a campaign of leaflet drops, cell phone text messages, emails 
and radio broadcasts that targeted the Iraqi leadership. Over 80 million leaflets were 
dropped in March of 2003.  Some leaflets threatened to destroy any military formation 
that stood and fought, while others encouraged the Iraqi populace and military to ignore 
the directives of the Baath Party leadership.193  The Air War College in a debriefing of 
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captured Iraq General Officers estimated that the U.S. Military faced only 15% of 
possible Iraq firepower due to PSYOP combined with precision bombing.194   In addition 
to leaflet operations, the Coalition broadcasted from fixed transmission towers as well as 
from the flying airborne broadcast platform, the EC-130E aircraft Commando Solo. The 
Coalition established Information Radio that used a similar format to Radio Sawa with a 
great deal of popular music interlaced with news and a few announcements. Leaflets were 
then produced to inform the target audience of the time and frequency of the radio 
broadcasts.195 
 
Figure 16.  Information Radio Leaflet IZD-001 and IZD-002C.196 
 
Local PSYOP radio stations were also set up outside of major population centers 
– one being the UK PSYOPS radio station, Radio Nahrain (Two Rivers), an FM radio 
station established on the outskirts of Basra. In addition to setting up its own radio  
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transmitters, the Coalition electronically jammed Iraqi radio stations, in order to gain a 
monopoly on the information available to the Iraqi people through this medium.197 
 On 20 March 2003, Coalition aircraft and ground units poured into Iraq from 
Kuwait.  Three days later the much famed “shock and awe” air campaign commenced 
with Baghdad, Mosul, Basrah, Kirkuk, and Tikrit being rocked with 1,500 bombs and 
missiles.  Within days the Iraqi military was reeling in one defeat after another. The 
commander of the Republican Guard 51st Division instantly surrendered with many of the 
9,000 soldiers holding 4th PSYOP Group (A) leaflets in their hands as well as the seizure 
of 200 tanks.198  However, the PSYOP results were not fully maximized as most Iraqi 
soldiers who surrendering were allowed to leave the battlefield and fade back into the 
populace.  Such leaflets like the ones dropped on the 51st Division and many others were 
also being monitored by the Iraqi government. Full knowing the power of PSYOP from 
the previous Gulf War, the Iraqi government established a special psychological 
collection committee to monitor and track Coalition leaflets.  To counter the American 
PSYOP, the Iraqi government warned its citizens that if they were caught with any 
PSYOP material, that they would be executed.199 Additionally, in an attempt to hijack the 
American PSYOP efforts, the committee distributed leaflets that imitated the American 
propaganda. 
 
                                                 
197 Steven Collins (LTC, Chief of PSYOP / Operations Division. SHAPE). “Mind War” (Mons, 
Belgium) June 2003. 
198  4th PSYOP Group (A)  JPOTF assessment and summary. March –April 2003. 
199  Ibid. 
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Figure 17. Enemy Propaganda found by the 10th Mountain Division.200 
  
In addition to radio and leaflets, the Coalition also broadcasted television signals 
via the EC-130 Commando Solo platform.201 By April 2007, Commando Solo had 
established a television broadcast to the Iraqi populace called “Towards Freedom TV.”  
The messages on Towards Freedom TV depicted Saddam Hussein as a tyrannical leader 
who had ruined Iraq and made its people suffer. Other broadcasts highlighted the 
luxurious palaces that Saddam had built throughout Iraq while his people lived in squalor. 
Still others focused on imploring Iraqi unit commanders and the populace to not destroy 
the oil fields.  An equally important PSYOP theme was the imploring of all civilians to 
stay in their homes.202  Despite the effectiveness of such messages, the only limitation to 
Commando Solo was the few numbers of such platforms, as well as constraints with on-
station time, maintenance, and commitments elsewhere.203 
 In addition to Commando Solo, the U.S. employed mobile ground PSYOP 
broadcasting units called SOMS-Bs (Special Operations Media Broadcasting System) 
once the ground forces began closing in on Baghdad.  The advantage of the SOMS-Bs 
                                                 
200 8th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified) , 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne). 
“Leaflets IZD-001 and IZD-002D,” (Fort Bragg, North Carolina). 
201  The Commando Solo is a C-130 type aircraft that is designed to provide strategic PSYOP via 
shortwave, FM, AM, television signals (UHF, VHF), as well as the capabilities to interfere and jam 
frequencies.   
202 4th PSYOP Group (A)  JPOTF assessment and summary. March –April 2003. 
203 During my tour in Iraq in 2005. a Commando Solo aircraft was diverted for strategic PSYOP 
operations off the coast of Cuba broadcasting Radio Marti against the Castro regime. 
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was their mobility on the battlefield to produce FM, AM, Shortwave, television 
broadcasts to the Iraqi populace.204  A total of three units supported Phase I operations. 
The first unit was in Kuwait as early as December of 2002, a second unit was with the 3rd 
Infantry Division as it raced to Baghdad, and the third was placed at the Baghdad 
International Airport (BIAP) just 6 miles west of Baghdad.205  One final platform was 
added when the USS Tarawa began broadcasting shortwave off the coast of Kuwait. 
 
Figure 18. SOMS-B in BIAP May 2003.206  
 
 As Coalition forces information systems were being established, PSYOP from 
Iraq was severely limited due to its information nodes being mostly eliminated. However, 
as the push for Baghdad was being waged, Iraq conducted ad hoc strategic PSYOP by 
allowing Al Jazeera to film the dead bodies of captured soldiers from the 507th 
Maintenance Company.  The intent was to provide a PSYACT against the American 
                                                 
204 The other 3 SOMS-Bs were supporting OEF in Afghanistan.  However, by 2005, they were 
rotating 5. Three  in Afghanistan and two in Iraq, and one to Fort Bragg, NC for refitting and repairs. The 
SOMS-B consisted of two parts:  
1. Mobile Radio Broadcast System (MRBS) 
AM -- 560 kHz - 1710 KHz 
FM -- 87.5 MHz - 108 MHz 
SW -- 1.5 MHz - 29.9 MHz 
       2. Mobile Television Broadcast System (MTBS) 
       TV -- 47 - 88 MHz, 174 - 230 MHz 
205 Determining the effectiveness of the SOMS-Bs, Commando Solo, and Sawa have been difficult to 
assess, especially in Phase I. However, in my interviews with Iraqis who worked in the Green Zone in 
Baghdad, the majority stated that they listened to the broadcast due to the media void as well as for 
information concerning the bombing campaign.  They also received the frequencies from the millions of 
radio leaflets that were dropped on Baghdad. 
206 3rd BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified) , 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne). 
“Leaflets IZD-001 and IZD-002D,” (Fort Bragg, North Carolina). 
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public that was similar to the desecrated bodies of Americans in Somalia.207  Another 
strategy used by Saddam Hussein was to accentuate the mistakes made by the U.S. in 
1991 in leading a revolution in Iraq, only to abandon the Kurds and the Marsh Arabs who 
Hussein then punished severely.208  Hussein, knowing that the Iraqi people were 
critically concerned about the U.S. leaving prematurely, played on this PSYOP theme 
extensively.209  He reminded the populace that the U.S. would only go as far as the oil 
fields and would never get as far north as Baghdad.  This was highly believable to the 
populace who had no reason not to believe Hussein.210   
 In countering Saddam’s PSYOP, the 3rd Infantry Division assigned the attached 
Combat Camera (COM –CAM) to take footage of the unit’s progress as well as the 
footage of the Coalition assisting the Iraqi populace with humanitarian aid.  The footage 
would then be uploaded to Commando Solo aircraft and SOMS-Bs, and played 
throughout Iraq.  Such images were difficult to counter by the state run media and many 
citizens in Baghdad had locally made, black market, satellite dishes, even though owning 
one meant six months in an Iraqi prison and a life-time of monitoring by Iraqi 
intelligence.211   
The Iraqi people soon began taking note on the regime’s lack of credibility, 
especially when the denial became comical when Muhammed Saeed al-Sahaf (“Baghdad 
Bob”) repeatedly stated that there were no Americans in the country, despite rapid troop 
advances. Combat camera effectively showed the Iraqi people that the regime was lying 
to them by showing American units alongside known landmarks within Iraqi cities. The 
most discreditable images for the Ba’athist regime were the undeniable evidence of 
                                                 
207 4th PSYOP Group (A) JPOTF assessment and summary. March –April 2003. 
208 3rd U.S. Infantry Division (Mechanized). “3rd Infantry Division After Action Review (AAR)” (Fort 
Drum, New York: February 2004), 269.  The 3rd Infantry Division was the “tip of the spear” in the push to 
Baghdad.  Other units were the 101st Airborne, 82nd Airborne, and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Unit. 
209 Even upon the capture of Saddam Hussein, many Iraqis that I talked to still feared that somehow 
some way, when the Americans left, that Saddam or members of the Ba’athist party would take over Iraq 
and punish those who consorted with the Americans.  
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid., 270. 
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columns of American units entering Baghdad.212  Below are the themes and messages 
from SOMS-B, Commando Solo, and the USS Tarawa that were conducted in May 2003. 
 
Figure 19. SOMS-B Coverage and Messages from Kuwait.213 
                                                 
212 3rd U.S. Infantry Division (Mechanized). “3rd Infantry Division After Action Review (AAR)” (Fort 
Drum, New York: February 2004), 269.   
213 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2003-04). 
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Figure 22. SOMS-B Coverage and Messages From the USS Tarawa.216 
 
Although gauging direct indicators of MOE are challenging in a combat 
environment, there were several positive indicators that showed successes in conjunction 
with the Coalition PSYOP themes.  For one, there were enormous surrenders from the 
regular army units, including the elite Republican Guard. When encountered by Coalition 
units, these Iraqi soldiers were doing exactly what the PSYOP leaflets had instructed 
them to do, and they were also frequently holding the leaflets themselves when they were 
discovered by American forces.  Secondly, there were very few Iraqis who were 
internally displaced during the major combat operations, following the PSYOP campaign 
the Iraqis had been instructed to stay in their homes due to the precision bombing 
                                                 
216 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2003-04). 
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campaign. Third, the Coalition managed to convince the Iraqi civilian and military target 
audiences that preserving the oil fields would only benefit them in the future.217 
C. PSYOP / DURING OCCUPATION IN OIF 
Once the Coalition began to establish itself in Iraq, the Coalition Provisional 
Authority came into effect as the proxy government whose aims were to immediately 
begin the process of establishing a democratically elected self ruling government in Iraq.  
To do this, a part of the overall plan to legitimize Iraq was to foster the growth of the 
media in Iraq.218  The four goals of the CPA included: 
1. Foster a professional Iraqi media industry which operates under the 
conventions of unbiased reporting and freedom of speech.   
2. Establish regional governorate strategic communications support 
teams to coordinate and facilitate campaigns. 
3. Establish regulations and licensing requirements for Iraqi media 
companies. 
4. Foster development of independent media companies to include 
production, market research, advertising, publishing and 
broadcasting companies.219 
From the four provisions, arose the Iraqi Media Network (IMN).  IMN was  
established to provide the needed jumpstart to satellite television, radio, and newspaper 
industries that would be at the heart of establishing credible media network in Iraq.220  At 
the same time, MNF-I established strategic communications (STRATCOM) as the 
coalition’s arm in conducting information operations at all levels within Iraq.  Under 
STRATCOM, there were the subordinate organizations of the Joint Psychological 
                                                 
217 JPOTP. “Brief on current Operations in support of OIF” (Baghdad, Iraq: May 2003). 
218 To this day, one cannot talk about the CPA without talking about the egregious errors that it made 
during its initial establishment. One – was the disbanding of the Iraqi military into the public sector that 
proved to be disastrous mistake that is being paid for today.  This decision de-legitimized the CPA as well 
as discredited them in the eyes of the Iraqi military that was waiting for them to be included in the plan to 
re-shape Iraq.  This decision continues to have a negative effect to this day, as well as a having a negative 
impact on PSYOP at all levels.   
219 CPA.  “Strategic Plan. Strategic Communications assessment” (Baghdad, Iraq 25 June 2004). 
220 Ibid.  
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Operations Task Force (JPOTF) headed by 8th Battalion / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne), 
Civil Affairs, Public Affairs (PAO), and Information Operations (IO).221  Additionally, 
civilian companies like Balloch & Roe were active in providing liaison support between 
military units and Iraqi media.222   
 Once the occupation phase of Iraq was commenced, the JPOTF begin establishing 
contracts with the local media. The JPOTF was given the means by MNF-I to fund the 
infusion of PSYOP in the various media throughout Iraq. This allowed the Coalition and 
the Iraqi government to benefit from white truthful PSYOP that would foster the 
legitimacy of the fledgling Iraqi government, legitimacy of the upstart Iraqi National 
Army and the Iraqi Security police, discrediting the former Ba’athist regime, and the 
tracking down of wanted insurgents and Al Qaeda fighters. 
The media organizations that the JPOTF came in contact with consisted of former 
Ba’athist news outlets that were either Sunni, Shia, or Kurdish in slant.  There were also 
formerly expelled news media such as Azzaman newspaper that had been run in London 
by expelled or fleeing Iraqis as well as the new IMN backed media, all of which were 
funded by the CPA.223  In a matter of months, news outlets in all forms began to sprout in 
Iraq. As each month progressed, the expanse of media in Iraq could be made evident in 
the explosion of satellite dishes that were being put up around the country.224 
As a consequence in a growing media infrastructure, there are a myriad of media 
outlets that can be used in addition to Iraqi merchandise companies that have been and 
will continue to be an important part of the Coalition information campaign.  One of the 
fastest growing industries in Iraq has been the swell of satellite, radio, and newspaper 
media outlets in Iraq that are quite novel to the country due to years of the state 
controlled the media.  During the time of the Hussein regime, there were no independent 
satellite television, radio stations, or newspapers allowed.  When the regime fell, a media 
                                                 
221  8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2003-04). 
222 Such coordination entailed receiving PSYOP products from the JPOTF and PSYOP staff and 
infusing them in the host nation media platforms.  
223 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2003-04). 
224 Similar to my experience in Kosovo, as soon as the Ba’athists regime was removed, my operations 
entailed driving throughout Iraq under cover to monitor and coordinate with the media for the JPOTF.  As 
each week and month passed, there were was a noticeable difference in the amount of satellite dishes that 
were being placed in residential homes.  
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void was filled by newspapers, radio stations, and satellite television stations that would 
run the gamut of ideology from pro-coalition, neutral, to anti-coalition.225   
Such a swell in media growth was also helped by a moderate portion of the Iraqi 
populace that could read and write English. During the 1970s, Saddam Hussein 
implemented English in schools due to the connection with oil and commerce.  As a 
result, the Iraqi populace today, has a moderate proportion of English speaking citizens, 
which aids in Coalition PSYOP efforts. By having a pool of translators, journalists, and 
broadcasters, the hired host media personnel could not only produce products in Arabic, 
but also produce them in English as well. This was especially convenient since most 
PSYOP products are approved at the flag officer level.226  Additionally, knowing English 
also meant knowing about the American culture as it bridged the gap and led to worker 
relationships that were ideal.  In fact, many Iraqis became so proficient and trusted, that 
they became quite knowledgeable of PSYOP and their opinions weighed heavily when it 
came to developing products.227 
It was also not surprising that some radio stations chose on their own to broadcast 
in English. In fact, the radio station atop the tallest building in Iraq, the Sheraton Ishtar 
Hotel, is an English speaking radio station that is used extensively by the Coalition due to 
its secure location. The station called IQ4, on the 104.5 frequency, reaches out to a young 
Iraqi target audience with popular western music that is mixed with PSYOP messages. 
Throughout the day and evening, the JPOTF would monitor the station and soon the 
PSYOP personnel began to notice a trend of Iraqi youth calling the station in English and  
                                                 
225 Baghdad Mosquito. Observations from daily reports (Baghdad, Iraq 2004-2005).  Baghdad 
mosquito is an organization that works directly for the embassy in Iraq. Its task is to track or report on all 
media in Iraq as well as their slant and talking points.  They also conduct polling data as well as operate 
throughout Iraq to assess rumors, attitudes, and morale of the populace. 
226 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2003-04).  
From 2004 to the current date, insurgent and Al Qaeda have targeted such workers of the coalition.  
Zarqawi targeted such personnel that worked for the coalition. He would then execute them and make video 
DVDs to threaten the populace.  I felt this intimidation has not worked since most Iraqis are desperate for 
work.  Despite the bombings and kidnappings, there are still long lines for a variety of jobs throughout Iraq. 
227 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2003-04). 
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requesting songs (usually rap and R&B).228   At IQ4, the Coalition found a radio that was 
secure and that was able to play PSYOP radio injects229 of themes related to legitimacy 
of the Iraqi government, the terrorist tips hotline, as well as establishing unity in Iraq.230 
 The second radio dissemination asset was the National Media Dissemination 
Platform.  Instead of just one radio station, the National Media Dissemination Platform 
would receive PSYOP radio injects from the JPOTF and then distribute them to five radio 
stations throughout Iraq.  Since the messages were going to a broad audience, the content 
had to be broad as well.  As the case, PSYOP injects concentrated on the broad 
operational themes of capturing Al Qaeda terrorists, legitimacy of the Iraqi government, 
voting, and the repetitive message of Iraqi unity.  The radio stations were: KHAK FM in 
Sulaymaniya, Kurdistan FM Radio-Dahuk, Baghdad FM, Baghdad AM, and Basrah FM.  
The success of the radio stations were evident, as they were a few attempted attacks that 
luckily failed.  Additionally, the paid translators that worked at the JPOTF were given the 
task to monitor the radio stations to ensure that they were playing the right messages or 
any messages at all.  Consequently, receiving payment was predicated on the precise 
injects being placed.231  
 An example of a PSYOP product played would be the “The Crisis.”  “The Crisis” 
was made by an Iraqi production company called Ocean Heart.  The POTF would give 
them a theme and they would do a show, interview guest, and discuss the latest issues 
that were pressing Iraq. After the one hour radio broadcasts was approved by the JPOTF  
 
 
                                                 
228 The Iraqi station manager from IQ4 stated that the youth would call to the station and speak 
English as a form of rebellion and self expression.  It is also noteworthy that IQ4 is positioned atop the 
tallest building in Iraq; the Baghdad Sheraton Ishtar Hotel, thus giving a propagation advantage. 
229 Injects are PSYOP broadcasts that are technically formatted to the mediums of radio, television or 
internet. 
230 IQ4 was my most reliable dissemination source for radio because of the relationship that our team 
developed with the station manager.  The station was owned by Balloch & Roe and was controlled by 
Ghassan Ridah, a self starting Iraqi who was the most trusted agent that the JPOTF employed. 
Unfortunately, he was kidnapped in December 2006 and his whereabouts are still unknown. 
231 Initially I had problems with the NDMP because I felt that they were not playing the correct injects 
that I instructed them to play.  I solved the problem by asking the tactical PSYOP teams in the area to 
verify with their translators, as well as using our own translators and Arab speaking soldiers to listen in to 
the stations in Baghdad. Additionally, I tasked the NDMP, to bring in recorded transcripts of the messages 
played. 
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and the assigned translators, the injects would then be given to IQ4 and the National 
Media Dissemination Platform. An example of a show that was translated by the POTF is 
as follows: 
1.  The Crisis” starts the program with the following lines. “The crisis 
winds storm us, from the electricity Crisis to Benzene (gasoline) and the 
Kerosene or natural gas is not the last one………. The drastic one is about 
the terrorists.   
 
2. The program continues with the overall theme; the reason for the 
electricity, kerosene, and natural gas crisis is due to the terrorists.  The 
program then links the acts of the terrorists with the long lines at the gas 
stations, the ever increasing gas prices at the fuel pumps.  Additionally, 
Iraqi citizens who depend on gasoline such as taxi drivers pay up to 10 to 
15 times the regular price in the black market.  Overall the first portion 
links the terrorists to the answer of the ironic question of a land so rich in 
oil but yet so deficient in the common fuels for the average Iraqi 
consumer.  The show then transitions into the specifics of the electricity 
crisis.  It states that Iraqi endure only 2 hrs of electricity a day.  During the 
2 hrs, the electricity often goes down on an average of 5-6 times.  For the 
electricity, it is the acts of the terrorists who destroy the power plants and 
kidnap the foreign workers that repair and work on the oil and power 
facilities.  Overall for this segment, it blames the terrorists for the acts that 
destroy the infrastructure.  It also depicts the terrorists as them not wanting 
a viable infrastructure for Iraq, as they link it with the success of the 
coalition and the much hated new democracy of Iraq.  The tail end of the 
program wraps the entire issue of the attacks on the infrastructure on the 
issue of security.  It implores Iraqis to stand up and fight the terrorists, 
support the police, Iraqi National Guard (ING), and the Iraqi army; as they 
cannot do it alone.  The program ends with the call to dispose and rid the 
terrorist from Iraq.  It is the terrorist that wishes to turn Iraq into a “dark 
epoch”.  The program then ends with Iraqi National Anthem.232 
 
Overall, the success of playing PSYOP products paid off in dividends, especially 
with the tips hotline for wanted insurgents that would be played on our broadcasts. The 
tips hotline would feature messages about the top 5 wanted insurgents in Iraq in a given 
week.  MOE amounted to receiving hundreds of phone calls from both inside and outside 
of Iraq on the whereabouts of insurgents. If a given tip amounted to a capture, the source 
would be financially rewarded.  Additionally, the two SOMS-Bs that were west of 
Baghdad, played the same mirror programs as in IQ4 and the National Media 
                                                 
232 Ocean Heart Productions, Baghdad, Iraq. “The Crisis”. April 2005. 
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Dissemination Platform.233  The combination of military and civilian radio stations gave 
the total number of 8 radio stations playing in Iraq.  Clearly, two military radio stations 
(SOMS-Bs) could have not covered the necessary area to reach the entire Iraqi audience.  
Host nation media was essential in filling the gaps.  The two figures below show the 
propagation of the SOMS-Bs and the host nation radio stations.  The first figure shows 
just the SOMS-Bs and it is quite evident that just using military radio stations would have 
not covered Iraq.  The second figure shows the SOMS-Bs with the augmented host nation 
media that provides a much better coverage of the radio target audience within Iraq.234  
From the comparison, it is clearly evident that the host nation media assets are a critical 
part of the information campaign in Iraq.235 
 
                                                 










                                                 
236 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005). Note 
that the SOMS-B package is quite limited in coverage.  Additionally, it could only broadcast in one mode; 
either AM or FM in this case.  
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Figure 24. SOMS-B and Host Nation Media Coverage in Iraq.237 
 
The second arm of PSYOP dissemination was the use of the host nation 
newspapers.  Like the radio stations, the JPOTF was absolutely incapable of replicating 
these various forms of media that were widely consumed by the target audiences.  Even if 
they could, the Iraqis would still prefer the Iraqi media over a media to known to be 
foreign.238  The newspapers worked the same way as the radio injects as they were given 
to the Balloch & Roe corporation for distribution to the local media.  Balloch & Roe 
distributed PSYOP products to three local newspapers: Azzaman, Al Taakhi, and Al 
                                                 
237 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005). 
Notice the coverage when limited military assets were augmented with host nation media.  It is of note that 
the propagation estimate was affected by terrain both mountainous and urban.  As such the circles would 
differ due to those affects.  Currently, there is a plan to extend the coverage of broadcast to all the cities 
along the Tigris / Euphrates belt as well as key towns in the Al Anbar province. 
238 Ibid. 
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Yoom.239 Additionally, PSYOP inserts were also given to the National Media 
Dissimination Platform which had access to eight newspapers.  The following are the 
newspapers, locations, slant, and circulation: 
• Kbit-Irbil-(Kurdish)-20,000 
• Hawlati- Sulaymaniyah (Weekly newspaper)-(Kurdish) / 10,000 
• New Kurdistan- Sulaymaniya- (Kurdish) / 20,000 
• Al Hadbaa- Mosul  (Only a weekly newspaper)-(Kurdish) / 4,000 
• Al Sabah-Baghdad-(IMN controlled no known bias) 30,000 
• Al Mada-Baghdad-(Communist) / 5,000 
• Al Manarah-Basrah- (No known bias / Printed in Kuwait) / 10,000 
• Al Nadah-Basrah- (Sunni) / 5,000 
• Iraq Al Yoom- (Pro Coalition / Shia Ownner) / 10,000 
• Al Taakhi- (Pro Coalition / Kurdish Newspaper / 17,000 
• Azzaman Newspaper- (No known bias) / 50,000240 
 The listed newspapers would receive a weeks worth of PSYOP products and then 
print them in their daily newspapers.  Overall, the print media reinforced and focused 
attention on the visual (electronic) PSYOP.  A typical PSYOP product in the Azzaman 
Newspaper would feature an opinion piece written by the JPOTF’s Iraqi journalist / 
translators, supported by a cartoon that usually targeted insurgents and Zarqawi.241  
Additionally, the tips line would also be placed in the newspapers that included visual  
 
 
                                                 
239 Balloch & Roe were instrumental in ensuring PSYOP messages were playing correctly at each 
media outlet.  Balloch & Roe hired Iraqi contractors and journalists that were absolutely superb.  They 
provided feedback on broadcasts and print issues, picked up the daily injects and print products from the 
JPOTF, and networked extensively throughout all the media networks in Iraq.  It was their networking 
prowess that allowed the JPOTF to establish a viable satellite television contract.  
240 Data provided to the author by Balloch and Roe during my assignment in Iraq.  Albeit by good 
intentions, Information Operations in Iraq established an enormous contract with an inexperienced 
company named Lincoln Group, that was in excess of over 100 million dollars to establish PSYOP 
contacts.  Besides the Lincoln Group products being ineffective, the JPOTF had already established 
contracts with newspapers in every major urban center of Iraq.  The Lincoln Group would then pay the 
exact same media outlets that the JPOTF had established. This led to confusion as to who had contracts 
with the established media as well as establishing a dysfunctional precedence with the Iraqi media as well.   
241 Ibid. 
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recognition, points of contact, and a reward if the information led to the capture.  Below 
are two examples of cartoons that would be placed alongside an OP / ED narrative in the 
various newspapers: 
 
         Figure 25. (Zarqawi Campaign 2005)242                      
 
 
Figure 26. (ISF and Iraqis Voting in 2005).243 
 
                                                 




                    Figure 27. (Rewards for Tips Program 2005).244 
 
To supplement PSYOP via radio and newspapers, the JPOTF along with a variety 
of units in Iraq used billboards to communicate with the populace. The billboard 
messages were designed to foster support from the Iraqi populace for the national army, 
the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and the Iraqi government.  Usually the billboards would 
stay up for three to six months and would be immediately replaced if they were damaged 
by weather or vandalism.  In terms of the JPOTF’s experience with billboards, the most 
popular were the ones that showed ISF or Iraqi armies as a powerful force.  Additionally, 
billboards were also used to drive home the message about Iraqis protecting their kids 
from terrorists by informing the authorities of their whereabouts or activities. The 
billboards were used in conjunction with all the forms of media that were intended to 
provide a repetitive PSYOP message while Iraqis were on the road.  Below is an example 
of a billboard that was placed along Route Irish, regarded as the most dangerous road in 
Iraq.245 
                                                 




Figure 28. (Anti-terrorist billboard along Route Irish near BIAP).246 
 
To augment the visual print media of newspapers, the JPOTF produced with the 
help of Iraqi journalists, translators, and artists, the Shanasheel Magazine (later renamed 
Yenebia) and the Thunder Team Comic Book.  Shanasheel magazine, Iraq’s first national 
magazine, was a cultural magazine that featured interviews with key Iraqi figures in 
government, as well as stories on infrastructure improvement such as schools, oil fields, 
and commerce.  The magazine was produced monthly with 50,000 copies that were 
printed and disseminated throughout Iraq.  The success of the Shanasheel magazine was 
negligible due to staffing and production issues that were later remedied by hiring an 
entire new crew to develop, print, and disseminate the magazine.  Once that occurred, the 
magazine became quite popular due to the content and the shiny paged appearance that 
the magazine featured.247  
                                                 
246 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005).An 
Iraqi billboard company named Ninevah Billboards were contracted by the JPOTF to emplace billboards.  
Unfortunately, the contract work was abruptly ended after Ninevah billboards was destroyed by an Iraqi car 
bomb. 
247 Ibid.  The JPOTF discovered that a magazine with attractive shiny paper of good quality was very 
popular among the Iraqi populace. Based on the culture, magazines and newspapers were passed between 
friends and family members.  Therefore, one print product can have the potential of 10 to 50 viewers.   
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Figure 29. (Shanasheel Magazine in Baghdad)248                      
     
 
 
Figure 30. (Shanasheel Magazine in Mosul).249 
 
Once Shanasheel Magazine was established, the JPOTF decided to go for a target 
audience that was younger by developing the Thunder Team Comic Book. Thanks to a 
great staff both U.S. and Iraqi, a quality paper source, and a reliable print contract, the 
Thunder Team Comic was an instant hit.  This was evident from the Tactical PSYOP 
Teams (TPTs) requesting more be made due to the instant following that the comic book 
created.250 The overall theme of the comic book involved the Thunder Team elite unit 
from the Iraqi Police (IP) and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) that would fight and defeat 
                                                 




the evil terrorists in Iraq; a good guy- bad guy story.  The plots always involved a 
terrorists trying to kill or harm innocent civilians only to be thwarted by the ever vigilant 
and powerful Thunder Team.   
In addition to the popularity with the youth of Iraq, the comic book became very 
popular among the Iraqi Security Forces who loved seeing themselves in a superhero 
role.  The result was the JPOTF benefiting from having multiple target audiences respond 
to the comic book that enforced the themes of legitimacy of the Iraqi government as well 
as capturing or killing the insurgents and terrorist.251 
 
Figure 31. (The Thunder Team Comic Book)252                      
                                                 




Figure 32. (“Tracking the Terrorist”).253 
 
 
The final PSYOP piece that the JPOTF added in 2005 was the use of satellite 
television.  By 2005, other than a few public service announcements, there were no long 
term contracted agreements with the satellite network affiliates for broadcast of PSYOP 
products.  This was a troubling fact since by 2005, Iraqis received most of their news and 
entertainment via satellite television.254  The two dominant satellite stations were Al 
Iraqiya and Al Sharkia; the two stations that evolved as major networks due to their 
initial funding in 2003 from the IMN and the CPA.  
For the JPOTF, the priority was contracting Al Iraqiya, because it was the most 
watched satellite channel for both news and entertainment: a STRATCOM poll had found 
that Al Iraqi held 50 percent of the viewers, while Al Sharkia captured only 30 percent.255  
Surprisingly, Al Jazeera and terrestrial television ranked at 10 percent equally.256  This 
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showed what the JPOTF had believed: that Iraqis wanted their news and entertainment 
from fellow Iraqis and not from a foreign source.  However, it was also assumed that in 
the hotbed areas of anti-coalition sentiment, Al Arabia, Al Jazeera and Al Sawa received 
much higher viewership.  There were other satellite stations that received negligible 
viewership such as Rotana, a satellite station owned by Rotana Hotels, a company out of 
Dubai.  Another was MBC, a Saudi -owned company broadcasting a mix of free-to-air 
news and entertainment channels via satellite from its headquarters at the Dubai Media 
City in the United Arab Emirates. 257 
By May of 2005, the JPOTF established a contract with Al Iraqia that was greatly 
assisted by Balloch & Roe as an intermediate agent.258  Once the contract was firmly 
established, the JPOTF decided to include PSYOP products that would air during prime 
time hours (1900-2200 hrs) on the Al Iraqiya satellite network.259  The use of Al Iraqiya 
provided the JPOTF an incredibly prolific platform for the dissemination of PSYOP.  The 
use of the expensive media platform was used almost extensively for countering Al 
Qaeda and the insurgency.  Breaking into the satellite TV market was a huge step, and 
one that was long over do, as the JPOTF was only utilizing PSYOP inserts in 
newspapers, magazines, comic books, and radio stations.   
Since most Iraqis watched satellite TV for both news and entertainment, PSYOP 
began to have a greater effect due to the fact it was now reaching an Iraqi wide audience.  
With hundreds of hours of video tape on hand that showed the destruction at the hands of 
insurgents, torture during the Saddam Hussein regime, and footage detailing the 
legitimacy of the Iraqi government, it was all too easy to incorporate the videos towards 
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the PSYOP satellite TV campaign.260  During the onset of the Al Iraqiya contract which 
began in May 2005, the JPOTF began to experiment with graphic scenes that included 
women and children laying in the streets in the aftermath of insurgency terrorist 
explosions as well as referencing the Al Maeda verses of the Koran.  The results created a 
wave of anger at the insurgency and helped to further demonize Abu Musab Al 
Zarqawi.261  In one notable video, Zarqawi’s famous human shields speech stated it was 
okay to kill the human shields regardless of being Muslim.  The video included his 
speech behind a backdrop of horrific explosions and actual footage of body parts.  The 
video set quite a ripple through Iraqi viewers as they were not accustomed to such 
PSYOP from the Coalition.  A good measure of effectiveness was the amount of phone 
calls from angry citizens to the satellite TV stations expressing their anger with terrorism, 
especially Zarqawi.262   
To make the PSYOP videos even more effective, they were placed during 
commercial time in the highest rated show in Iraq, “Terror in the Hands of Justice.”263  
“Terror in the Hands of Justice”, was a reality show that aired the grieving families of the 
victims while calling for justice against the terrorist responsible for their love ones’ death, 
while also airing actual terrorist who confess and repent for their actions.  The PSYOP 
campaign was different than the traditional antiseptic peace dove or children playing 
while depicting the future of Iraq.  The more Zarqawi bombed citizens, the more the 
JPOTF demonized him through every form of media available, over-and-over again to 
the Iraqi populace.  
Finally in October of 2005, Ayman al-Zawahri, Al Qaeda’s number 2 leader, 
wrote a letter that questioned Zarqawi’s methods that involved killing thousands of 
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Muslims. Zawahiri devoted significant attention to al-Zarqawi's attempts to start a civil 
war with the rival Muslim Shiite sect, the majority that now dominates the new Iraqi 
government. Ultimately, al-Zawahri concluded that violence, particularly against Shiite 
mosques, only raises questions among Muslims.264 He also pointed out that "more than 
half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media…we are in a media battle 
in a race for the hearts and minds of our umma," or community of Muslims.”265  In short, 
Zawahiri’s complaints about Zarqawi’s methods - were directly in line with the themes 
and objectives of the Zarqawi PSYOP campaign that the JPOTF was conducting. 
In addition to the tips hotline and the Zarqawi broadcasts, there were other videos 
that highlighted the positives in Iraq.  For instance, the JPOTF began airing videos that 
featured the construction projects that the military and civilian engineers had built. By 
May 2005, the 1,000th project was built in Iraq with little fanfare.  Besides the local 
populace, most Iraqis had no knowledge of the projects being built for Iraq.   As a result, 
the JPOTF developed video commemorating the 1,000th project and featured a video per 
week on the status of construction operations within Iraq.   The construction videos were 
considered a success as it exposed to the Iraqis that progress was being made.  The videos 
were especially important during times when Iraqis were upset at shortages in electricity 
and gasoline.266 
In terms of the JPOTF disseminating video products, it had for the first time, a 
platform that could reach the entire Iraqi audience via the most watched form of media 
throughout the country.  Below are the locations and stations that satellite TV was aired 
throughout Iraq.267 
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Table 1. Locations of Satellite TV coverage.268 
 
LOCATION CHANNEL DURATION LOCATION CHANNEL DURATION
Baghdad 7 1 Min. Karbala 5 1 Min. 
Baghdad 9 1 Min. Karbala 6 1 Min. 
Baghdad 37 1 Min. Maysan 11 1 Min. 
Mosul 7 1 Min. Basrah 11 1 Min. 
Mosul 9 1 Min. Al Garbi 9 1 Min. 
Kirkuk 6 1 Min. Dewenia 12 1 Min. 
Baquba  22 1 Min. Tikrit 6 1 Min. 
Al Qaim 7 1 Min. Suq Shiokh 26 1 Min. 
Kut  9 1 Min. Ramadi 5 1 Min. 
Haditha 6 1 Min. Najaf 5 1 Min. 
Al Nasir 9 1 Min.    
  
 The addition of the Al Iraqia satellite contract added 21 Iraqi satellite channels 
that the JPOTF could now disseminate products throughout Iraq.  This was critical in 
diversifying the JPOTF’s PSYOP capability in reaching the entire populace of Iraq.  All 
together, this allowed the JPOTF to now disseminate products via satellite TV, radio, 
terrestrial TV, newspapers, internet, magazines, comic books, posters, handbills, as well 
as a variety of imaginative items such as soccer balls, stickers, match books, and 
stationary.   
Essentially, a good PSYOP program should have a saturation effect that involves 
a variety of media sources; the addition of satellite television added that dimension.  An 
example below is the Zarqawi program.  Just as MNF-I dedicated a considerable amount 
of resources in trying to capture or kill Zarqawi, the JPOTF followed suit by dedicating 
an entire PSYOP campaign to this individual who was creating so much destruction in 
Iraq. This campaign was executed by utilizing every form of media available to the 
JPOTF.  Although Zarqawi’s foolish tactics of destroying Shia mosques and beheadings 
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demonized him on his own merits, PSYOP was able to capitalize by repetitively attacking 
him on all fronts while creating an even bigger wedge with him and the populace.269  
 
Figure 33. (Zarqawi Campaign 2005-6).270 
 
 However, despite the eventual killing of Zarqawi, the ongoing PSYOP campaign 
now has to contend with the legacy he left Iraq with: the sudden rise in sectarian violence 
that has claimed thousands of Iraqi lives.  The challenge of controlling Iraq’s surge of 
violence has left Iraqis with a bitter taste in their mouths concerning the U.S. presence 
there.  This has made the PSYOP mission in Iraq extremely challenging to pull off. 
The recent Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) published some alarming figures about the 
confidence in the Coalition and the new government to stabilize Iraq. Recent polls 
suggest an information and PSYOP crisis within Iraq.  Only 36 percent of Iraqis feel their 
country is headed in the right direction, and 79 percent have a “mostly negative” view of 
the influence the U.S. has had on their country.  Even more alarming, is that 61 percent 
                                                 
269 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005). 
270 Ibid. 
97 
approve of attacks on U.S. forces.271  This is coupled with an unfavorable opinion 
throughout the world and a growing unfavorable opinion in the United States populace as 
well as its lawmakers. The result is a growing trend that parallels the findings in Chapter 
3 with how PSYOP was affected in Vietnam.  Essentially, the challenges of the combat 
situation on the ground have created a discrediting effect upon most of the PSYOP effort 
because the target audience sees the reality on the ground.  The Iraqis have become 
frustrated at a U.S. force that fails to stop the daily car bombings that are killing so many 
Iraqis.  Getting the Iraqis to believe that the sky is blue when all they see is red is a good 
analogy to the campaign there.   However, the one ace in hole for PSYOP has been the 
populace’s disdain for Al Qaeda due to all the carnage they have caused.  This continues 
to be an angle that PSYOP will exploit for months to come with considerable success.272 
Throughout OIF, the U.S. has shown an incredible resiliency by sticking with the 
commitment of not leaving Iraq like it did in Vietnam.  The U.S. has now committed to 
altering its ground strategy while intensifying its efforts to train-up the Iraqi military and 
police force. Fortunately, for the U.S., most Americans feel that pulling out of Iraq would 
be a mistake; the national will to continue the fight is obviously much different than in 
Vietnam.  With the new strategy implemented, hopefully Baghdad will be wrestled away 
from the clutches of the insurgents, the hope of stability and an increase confidence in the 
populace will make the job of reaching the hearts and minds that much easier there. Then 
you have to do the same with rest of Iraq while slowly squeezing the insurgency.  
There is no doubt that PSYOP along with other elements of Special Operations in 
Iraq will be needed for years to come. Just as the U.S. were conducting PSYOP missions 
in Iraq long before OIF, so too will the need to conduct PSYOP in Iraq long after most 
U.S. forces have redeployed and the mission in Iraq becomes advisory in nature. That 
message will continue to be a slow and methodical process of products, series, and 
campaigns whose results may not take effect in months or even years from now; even so, 
the results will be difficult to gauge as history has shown.  However, what has been 
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clearly evident is the fact that Iraqis respond better to the PSYOP message when it is 
coming from their fellow Iraqis via the Iraqi media.273 
D. PSYOP / THE MERLIN INITIATIVE IN SUPPORT OF OEF 
By 2004, the Combined Forces Campaign-Afghanistan (CFC-A), were  
distributing PSYOP products to over 54 radio stations throughout Afghanistan in addition 
to two SOMS-Bs. Overall, the PSYOP broadcasts were effective in keeping the populace 
informed, distributing information of wanted Taliban and Al Qaeda, and delivering news 
and entertainment via the dominant form of broadcast in Afghanistan; shortwave radio.  
However, with 54 stations spread all throughout Afghanistan, it was difficult to gauge 
whether the radio stations were up to date in playing the correct PSYOP injects, or even 
playing them at all.  Additionally, the radio stations were quite weak in strength and had 
only a 20-30 km range.274 Traveling through Afghanistan was quite difficult due to the 
mountainous terrain, poor roads, and pockets of Taliban resistance.  What was needed 
was a nationwide propagation medium that could blanket the entire country with 
shortwave radio.  The answer was VT Merlin out of London, England. 
VT Merlin was and continues to be a leading provider of critical communications  
services to customers in the space communications, broadcast, defense, and security 
market sectors. VT Merlin had the extensive experience that CFC-A desired as well as 
powerful transmitters that could not only reach Afghanistan, but could also provide a 
strong signal against Chinese jamming or attempts to overpower the frequencies in 
Afghanistan.275 
Once the contract with VT Merlin was established, broadcasts to Afghanistan 
soon followed with the first signal being transmitted in September of 2004.  What made  
the Merlin program unique was that it was a radio station whose programming was 
produced in Fort Bragg, NC, by Afghan natives who were hired as journalists, 
broadcasters, and translators.  Together with the PSYOP personnel, the group recorded 
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12.5 hours of news, entertainment, weather, sports, music, as well as scheduled PSYOP 
messages each hour.  By December of 2004, the group had reached a tempo of creating 
18 hours of recordings for each day, and the 3rd and 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group 
(Airborne) worked around the clock to produce a fresh new 18 hour program for each 
day.  Once an 18 hour disk was made, it was immediately transferred to VT Merlin via a 
File Transfer Protocol connection (FTP).  Once received, the engineers at VT Merlin 
would double check the disk and then blast the broadcast via shortwave from England at 
their station sites in the United Arab Emirates.  The result was a powerful shortwave 
signal that blanketed Afghanistan.276  
The program was an instant success with a powerful signal that reached by 95 
percent of the entire Afghan populace.  To track the propagation, VT Merlin engineers 
were positioned in Pakistan and Uzbekistan, supplemented by ground tactical PSYOP 
teams (TPTs) that monitored the station while conducting their missions. Below is one 
such signal report that was conducted by the TPTs. 
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Figure 34. (Merlin Signal Reception).277 
 
  A critical piece to our operations was getting the target audience to tune with the  
broadcasts.  This was conducted months before the first broadcast took place by 
announcing the oncoming arrival of the new broadcast.  The populace of Afghanistan was 
informed via leaflets, posters, The Peace Newspaper, as well utilizing various radio 
stations to broadcast the arrival date and most importantly, the frequencies on which the 
Merlin broadcast would play.278   
As hoped, the Merlin initiative proved to be a big success. It easily gained 
nationwide recognition and soon started to compete with BBC broadcasts throughout 
Afghanistan. The big picture was the 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) had produced a 
product that was made in North Carolina and then broadcasted to the other side of the 
world to cover all of Afghanistan.  It is and continues to be a strategic PSYOP tool that is 
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helping shape Afghanistan as well as a perfect example of how 6 Afghan host nation 
media personnel can reach and capture an entire Afghan listening audience.279 Below are 
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Product # Topic Length (d,p)
1251 Coalition is strong and has solidarity and resolve D0:37, P0:23
1253 Report Illegal checkpoints D0:31, P0:30
1261 Non-interference, deadly force authorized D0:27, P0:33
1262 Do not Support terrorists D0:34, P0:24
1263 Terrorists not safe in Afg. D0:45, P0:22
1264 Neg. results of supporting terrorism D0:29, P0:17
1277 Support the ANA and Coalition D0:29, P0:24
1294 Leader targets are discredited D1:19, P1:10
1309a Reward for Bin Laden D1:16, P1:00
1310a Reward for Ayman Al-Zawhiri D1:45, P1:08
1327 Informed of activities, plans, etc. D1:11, P1:03
1328 Informed of activities, plans, etc. D1:44, P2:05
1337 Do not shine lights at aircraft D0:57, P1:09
1356 Do not play with toy guns D1:40, P1:29
1357a Turn in ACM equipment D1:40, P1:29
1395 Support Afghan Government D1:30, P1:24
1449a Rewards for terrorist info D0:39, P1:07
1459 Evils of the Taliban D1:58, P1:47
1469a International Support to AF D1:39, P1:30
1471a Report ACM activity D1:37, P2:05
1472a Report ACM activity D0:41, P0:57
1473a Rewards for ACM information D0:34, P0:24
1484 Desertion and defects with Taliban D2:09, P1:05
1494 Searching of females need D2:16, P2:38
1498 Mine and UXO dangers D1:33, P1:58
1499 Wash hands and Boil Water D1:05, P1:22
1501 LAG and CF here to help and stay D1:39, P1:30
1502 Don't attempt to bribe CF for PUCs D1:28, P0:36
1517 Landmines and explosives deadly D1:40, P1:36
1518 ACM offering monetary rewards D1:37, P2:05
1532 ANA motivation to battle terrorism D1:36, P2:15
1535 Don't kill CFs or AMFs for money D1:44, P2:00


















                                                 
281 8th BN / 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (JPOTF FWD Afghanistan: 
November 2004). Above is an example of 1 hour radio wheel.  The majority of the hour is information, 
news, and music that the target audience is accustomed to.  18 of these wheels are produced each day and 
then sent to VT Merlin.  Also note that each PSYOP message has to be stated twice for the Pashtu and Dari 































1 Radio wheel = 
1 hour of broadcast
 
 












Figure 37. (Shortwave propagation strength).282 
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This thesis set out to investigate the question of whether or not psychological 
operations benefit from the use of host nation media. To answer this question, the thesis 
examined a series of historical periods that began from World War II, Korea, Vietnam, 
Operation DESERT STORM, and the Balkans, focusing on the use of host nation media 
by parties to the conflict in each of these encounters. The thesis then provided 
information from current operations in Iraq and a specific platform in Afghanistan were 
analyzed to see if using foreign personnel to broadcasts the U.S. PSYOP message was 
beneficial in today’s era as well.  Overall, the answer is yes, utilizing host nation media 
enhances psychological operations efforts, but that the efforts can be used against a 
country and that on their own, are not enough to turn the tide of a war that is being lost on 
the kinetic battlefield. 
 One fact that was made certain throughout this thesis, was that every major 
conflict analyzed from World War II to the present did in fact utilize host nation media 
assets whether it was beneficial or not.  Secondly, as an example relevant to U.S. 
operations, every major conflict from the same time period, involved military operations 
in areas where the American soldier and civilian were not truly familiar both in culture 
and in language.  In World War II the culture and language was German and Japanese.  
In Korea the culture and language was Korean.  In Vietnam it was Vietnamese. In the 
Balkans it was Albanian and Serb / Croat.  In DESERT STORM and OIF it was Arabic.  
In Afghanistan it was Pashtu and Dari.  In each of the these cases, Americans have been 
sent being fully expected to win the information and the PSYOP battle with an enemy 
that knew the language and culture better than 99 percent of most the Americans 
involved.  The same could also be said for the Germans, British, Korean, Vietnamese, as 
well.  So how do you level the playing field?  The answer of course, is the use of host 
nation media assets.    
 However, did the historical examples back up that conclusion?  In examining the 
historical impact of incorporating or manipulating host nation media, this thesis delved 
into its impact during World War II, The Korean Conflict, The Vietnam Conflict, 
Operation Desert Storm, the peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, as well as OEF and 
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the examination of the Merlin program in OEF. Whether it was establishing clandestine 
radio stations, influencing the legitimate media, incorporating host nation journalists, 
linguists, and broadcasters; the use of host nation media has left an indelible mark on 
deception, psychological, and information operations. 
 In World War II, the concept and implementation of setting up black PSYOP 
radio stations by both the Germans and the British lends credence to the importance and 
profound impact of utilizing host nation media.  Essentially, if the host nation media was 
not important, the opposing forces would have not gone through the extensive trouble and 
expending precious resources in replicating it. However, the dividends for successfully 
replicating the media were plentiful. With just a few radio stations and a powerful 
transmitter, the British misinformation campaigns created havoc among German troops 
and civilians. By the wars end, many in German populace were perplexed by the 
confusion in their perceived trusted media. As soon as the proper German authorities 
gave instructions to the German populace, a British radio station would immediately dial 
in to the frequency and give false instructions.  Overall, affecting the host nation media 
had an immediate impact on the morale of the populace, tying up the enemies’ resources, 
and PSYOP as a whole.   
 In Korea, the U.S. began with a non-existent PSYOP program that was instantly 
stood up once the Koreans and Chinese were broadcasting PSYOP messages to the North 
and South Korean populaces, as well as to the North Korean and Chinese soldiers.  
Additionally, the millions of leaflets that were delivered to the enemy were perfected by 
local nationals that added all the nuances of culture into effective PSYOP products that 
would encourage the enemy to surrender as well as lowering the morale of the North 
Koreans. For the poorly clothed and ill-equipped North Korean and Chinese soldiers, 
hearing or reading PSYOP messages in their own language in the midst of freezing, being 
continuously bombed or shelled contributed to a lowering of morale and fighting resolve, 
as well as successfully enticing thousands to surrender.   
 In Vietnam, PSYOP planners were inhibited because of the combat situation on 
the ground.  The United States was fighting a determined enemy that dictated where and 
when they would fight. Essentially, the U.S. was fighting a guerrilla war with 
conventional forces and tactics.  The successes of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong 
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limited the success of PSYOP because it undermined the credibility of the US messages. 
In order for PSYOP to have worked, the enemy would have been convinced that their 
effort was futile and that it was inevitable that the Americans and South Vietnamese 
would be victorious. On a daily basis, the situation on the ground contradicted the 
messages being created in  the PSYOP campaigns, and thus the PSYOP efforts were only 
able to secure small-scale, limited successes.   
In the end, Vietnam reinforced the fact that PSYOP alone is not enough to turn 
the tide of a war that is being lost on the ground.  However, the individual successes that 
PSYOP achieved cannot be forgotten.  Campaigns such as The Wondering Soul as well 
as the PSYOP radio programs did have a profound effect on the enemy.  Such successes 
were only possible because it incorporated local personnel as well as host nation radios 
and newspapers.  Unfortunately, PSYOP did not enjoy the staying power because the 
overall message was neither believable nor credible to the enemy.  Vietnamese PSYOP 
was extremely effective at breaking the will of the American people. Giap and 
Westmoreland met 30 years after the war and Westy said "you never won a tactical 
battle" Giap replied "we never had to".  They were focused on the strategic fight of 
breaking America's will to fight with daily casualty reports and fostering the anti-war 
movement.  In an indirect way, the North Vietnamese benefited from the use of host 
nation media of the U.S.  It was the media in the U.S. that brought the war to the living 
rooms of Americans, tape delayed just in time for the evening news.  This had a profound 
impact on the national will to carry on with the fight.  This then affected the politicians to 
begin cutting funds for the war and then ultimately brought all soldiers home from a war 
that would be America’s first defeat. 
 In Desert Storm and the Balkans, the U.S. was dramatically affected by the 24 
hour news cycle that affected both wars.  In both those conflicts, the U.S. learned to cope 
with and even use the international media to its advantage.  In Desert Storm the U.S. 
isolated Iraq from the rest of the world by knocking out most communication nodes. 
Much of what was gleaned from the war is what the Americans fed CNN.  The Iraqi 
government was thus dependent on the international news which was being fed by the 
Americans.  This led to the perfect trap of feinting in the East while the Coalition forces 
struck in the West.  Additionally, PSYOP planners would take advantage of favorable 
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combat conditions resulting in over 150,000 Iraqis surrendering.  Such success was the 
culmination of leaflets, radio programs, television, that was driven by host nation assets 
and personnel from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait as well as other Arab states.  The result was a 
complete collapse of the Iraqi ground forces. The PSYOP successes were further 
underscored due to the Iraqis following the exact instructions that were read or heard in 
Arabic via host nation media.   
  In OIF, the use of PSYOP was instrumental in convincing the Iraqis to surrender 
as well informing the populace to stay in their homes as the American forces were racing 
up to Baghdad.  During Phase I, the use of host nation personnel left their mark on every 
PSYOP product via television and radio broadcast, newspapers, leaflet, magazine, and 
billboards that left Iraq paralyzed and toppled within a matter of a few weeks.  However, 
the occupation of Iraq has gone counter to everything achieved during Phase I.   
Insurgent tactics coupled with a resilient Al Qaeda network have turned the 
“battle for ideas” in the favor of enemy.  The U.S. is no longer seen as dominating or 
even having control of the war.  Such events have crept into the global media with 
troubling results such as: lawmakers actively split over withdrawing troops, world wide 
condemnation of U.S. actions, support for the war waning in the U.S., a disgraced White 
House, over 3,000 U.S. personnel killed, Iraq appearing to head into a civil war, and the 
most unfortunate: and an emboldened Al Qaeda / insurgency that is willing to fight to 
until the U.S. concedes defeat and pulls out.  Effectively, the insurgents have taken a 
page from the tactics of Ho and the NVA. 
In OEF, the Merlin shortwave program demonstrated the power of strategic reach 
that is capable of blanketing all of Afghanistan with their primary medium for 
information, shortwave broadcasting.  A team of 7 soldiers and 6 Afghan personnel have 
become the number 2 listened program behind the BBC, all why being made in Fort 
Bragg, NC, emailed to London, and then sent out to Afghanistan.  
 In closing, the analysis from World War II to the present shows not only that host 
nation media is beneficial towards conducting PSYOP, but it is absolutely essential if you 
want to do PSYOP at all.  With the host nation personnel, the U.S. would be simply 
relegated to conveying their message in an American way with an American tongue.  
Such efforts would result in most products being lost in translation while our hard power 
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assets would have to fight opposing hard power assets that would have no doubt 
surrendered under favorable combat situations.  However, an additional lesson that this 
thesis has demonstrated is that if a country does not attempt to win the war of ideas, the 
enemy will do it for you.  Additionally, the best PSYOP in the world coupled with the 
best host nation media in the world is not enough to overcome a losing combat situation 
on the ground.  Vietnam taught us that, and hopefully Iraq will not follow suit. 
Ending Scenario: 
Just as the messages that were heard in the native tongues of the enemies that the 
U.S. has fought since World War II, imagine such a similar twist if the United States 
were ever invaded.  Imagine if you will, in a scenario similar to the movie Red Dawn, if a 
foreign enemy were to invade and successfully occupy the United States.  It can be 
certain that there would be a pitch battle, state by state, against the invaders.  However, 
imagine if the enemy was beginning to win the war and many American assets and 
personnel were beginning to be used for the enemies’ PSYOP campaign.  Imagine tuning 
into your radio station or reading your newspapers only to hear the voice of a fellow 
American urging all their fellow Americans to quit and surrender.  Americans (host 
nation media) on every dial telling you that to fight is futile and will only result in the 
death of you are your family.  The effects of hearing and reading a message in your own 
language and from fellow Americans would be unnerving to many, and would no doubt 
challenge the fighting resolve of most, especially if the fighting was not going well and 
the situation seemed hopeless.  Such was the effect of utilizing host nation media in the 
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